

16 MARCH 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Africa** ***(Sub-Saharan)***

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# Africa (Sub-Saharan)

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**Northern Resettlement Effort Resumes Without Coercion**

34200006b Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG correspondent Stefan Klein datelined Nairobi, 12 January: "Ethiopia's New Resettlement Action With Less Coercion; the Regime Wants to Leave Itself Less Open to Attack by Western Criticism Than in the 1984 Year of Famine"]

[Text] In the frontpage article of ETHIOPIAN HERALD the keyword "voluntary" occurred as often as three times. Already in the first sentence it was noted that 364 drought victims from the northern highland of Wollo had voluntarily stated their readiness to resettle in the western province of Gojam to start a new life there. And the farmer Tegegne Deribew, father of seven children, one of the 364 resettlers, was quoted as saying that he had volunteered for resettlement because the drought makes life in his home area unbearable.

The report in the HERALD makes it very evident that since the resumption of the controversial resettlement program the regime in Addis Ababa tries very hard not to once again leave itself open to attacks like those that occurred at the start of the undertaking in October 1984. At that time, at the height of the hunger catastrophe a very hurried start had been made to resettle hundreds of thousands from the drought-plagued northern highland to Ethiopia's west—and thus had laid itself open to massive criticism from the Western world.

It was claimed that coercion was being used, families were separated, the resettlement areas were not at all prepared for the newcomers. In short, a mass shift of people was being pushed through ruthlessly and by all available means—that is what was heard from the West at that time. Some of the blame was correct, much proved to be exaggerated and in the general wave of criticism the fact was lost that the basic idea of the resettlement program was clearly reasonable. The northern highland is susceptible to drought, is severely damaged by erosion, and overpopulated, while the country's southwest is relatively assured of rain, is fertile and still rather underpopulated.

But what the critics were concerned with above all was the way and the speed with which the program was carried out. Their charges apparently did not leave the rulers unimpressed: After 600,000 people had been resettled, the program was suspended—to consolidate what had been achieved, according to the official statement. But the planned number of a total of 1.5 million people to be resettled remained unchanged and thus it was not really surprising that the program was resumed during the past month—but this time under different circumstances.

Western diplomats in Addis Ababa are convinced that this time the rulers will "proceed very cautiously," as one of the diplomats put it. Another diplomat said: "The Ethiopian government is aware that there is no point in compelling resettlement." The reason for the observers to speak of a "completely new beginning" in the first place is that apparently more importance is really being attached to voluntariness. That can also be seen from the fact that there is no longer any quota system: "How the program develops," it is heard in the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) responsible for the resettlement, "depends solely on the number of people who volunteer for resettlement."

While at the start of the resettlement action hundreds of thousands were shifted, since the resumption of the program there have been fewer than 3,000. But it is believed in the RRC that the number will shoot up, for "the farmers in the north are becoming aware that the drought in their area has become chronic." But it is the big unanswered question whether this will increase the readiness for resettlement. For example, when farmers in the northern province of Tigre, which now again suffers a severe famine, are questioned, there is hardly one who wants to leave and start anew some other place. "If there is no longer any rain, then we are simply going to die here," is to a typical answer.

After all it is not surprising that people who have lived in the highland for generations and feel at home there would permit themselves to be transplanted to the western lowlands only with greatest reluctance, to an area where the soil and production conditions are completely different. But if the government regards this as a suicidal, disastrous attitude, will it not be inclined to exert pressure in the interest of those affected? The reaction in the Western world can easily be imagined, particularly since the opponents of the regime fighting in the north even now are doing everything to discredit the resumption of the resettlement program as much as possible.

The charge is that the government, just as 3 years ago, is taking advantage of the famine to step up the resettlement, in other words, taking advantage of hunger and despair to depopulate the rebellious provinces in the north. But not even the most critical of the Western observers believe that this is the motive of the rulers. But it is true that the resumption of the resettlement action coincides timewise with the start of the new famine. But Michael Priestley, appointed by the United Nations as coordinator of the rescue operations, does not see anything objectionable in that: "After all, that is the logical time. Now when the people are again faced with ruin they are psychologically most likely prepared to let themselves be resettled." That may be called "taking advantage"—but it is more likely to be viewed under the aspect of welfare. Moreover the charges of the rebels who pretend to be moral (who claim to speak in the name of the people) sound rather hollow in view of the fact that only recently they shot up a relief shipment consisting of 23 trucks with 400 tons of food.

**Signs of Willingness To Effect Agricultural Reform Reported**

3420006a Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG correspondent Stefan Klein datelined Mekelle, January: "Hoping for the Saving Breakthrough; in the Country Stricken by Drought Catastrophes Much Points to a Change of Course Facilitating Western Support"]

[Text] It is a large building site—but there are no cranes, no construction vehicles, no roar of engines. It is almost a still life, a picture from Mao Zedong's China: an enormous terrain and distributed over it—small and busy like ants—hundreds, perhaps thousands of workers. Some scratch open the dried-out, crusty soil with plows pulled by oxen, while others push wheelbarrows full of sand uphill onto the ridge of a mighty dam. It is an earth dam that is being built here by manual labor and some time in the future is supposed to dam up water. Water? It is bone-dry in Mekelle, dusty and hot. The latest rainy season was the worst in a long time. The weather here in Tigre Province could drive a person to despair. And nonetheless: The people build a reservoir dam. That is like a stubborn demonstration of their faith that things cannot go on like that forever, that in the near future there will certainly be a good rain again, won't it.

Or do we interpret too much into that? It is a food-for-work project: The people provide their working power and are repaid with food (made available by the World Food Program). In view of the newly threatening hunger catastrophe the daily food ration could be enough incentive—regardless of whether or not they believe in the idea and purpose of the project. But the mere fact that such projects are undertaken at all shows that in this province, which belongs to the regions especially susceptible to drought, there still exists resistance to the vagaries of nature, that they have not yet given up. Forty-six such dams have been built since the last big drought 3 years ago, 20 more are to follow up to the beginning of the next rainy season. As much rain water as possible is to be caught and dammed up to irrigate the fields, to meet the demand of man and beast. Something is happening but by far not enough.

**The Population—Exhausted**

Ethiopia's own funds are tight and a large part is consumed by the war against the rebel movements in the north and outside support comes only in small doses. Just now the country does get large-scale humanitarian aid but warning voices had been raised even during the big rescue operation 3 years ago. For example, in the opinion of the Swiss Ethiopia expert Hans Hurni, if the humanitarian aid is not coupled with long-term development aid, "then a disservice is being performed for Ethiopia's western sector." Without a "considerable

increase in the capacity for development," aid to mitigate hunger does more harm than good, for it enables people to survive in an area that cannot feed the population without structural changes even under normal weather conditions. Increased development aid continues to be out of the question: Ethiopia receives less than any other country in Africa: with \$9 per capita, just about half of the average amount received by Black African countries. For example, neighboring Somalia receives almost eight times as much.

Ethiopia's neglect with respect to development policy is criticized as "highly illogical" in a paper of the UN developmental program (UNDP), for in this manner the country at the Horn of Africa becomes the "permanent candidate for humanitarian aid." This is indeed a very realistic prospect, for Ethiopia is now in a hopeless situation. Even among the poor of Black Africa the country is far below average: The life expectancy of its inhabitants is lower, infant mortality is higher. While in the 29 poorest Black African states a quarter of the population on average has access to clean water, in Ethiopia this holds true for only 14.5 percent. Instead of 39,000 people having to share a physician, as is the case in comparison countries, the number in Ethiopia is 88,000 people. Despite maximum efforts of the regime in the educational field, the number of children going to school in Ethiopia continues to be smaller than in other countries, and the GNP at \$110 per capita is only half that of the other have-nots.

The population growth of 2.9 percent a year has caused the pressure on the land to increase which further exhausts it to the point that some of it is hardly capable of regeneration. Especially the highland comprising 540,000 square kilometers, where 88 percent of the population lives and where by far the greatest part of the cultivated soil is located, is seriously impaired. Half of it is considered damaged by erosion, including an area of 20,000 square kilometers which is so heavily damaged that it is no longer suitable for farming. A study by the World Bank and the FAO includes the following pessimistic observation: "During their lifetime, Ethiopia's children of today will see one third of the highland being lost to farming while the population will triple in size."

The consequences of the population pressure and soil erosion will even be intensified by archaic production methods: Fertilizers and pesticides are hardly used among the small farmers and, as a result, the per-hectare yields are considerably lower than in many other African states. In addition there is the isolation of the farmers in the mountains who are, to a large extent, literally cut off from the market economy: Three quarters of the farms are located more than half a day's march from the nearest all-weather road. And in addition to all that, there is the civil war with its destruction of the infrastructure.

All these factors have contributed to the fact that the Ethiopian farmers are unable, even under the best of climatic conditions, to produce the necessities required

by the population of 47 million: The so-called structural, in other words the entirely normal, food deficit not attributable to the weather is estimated at about 500,000 tons a year and it will continue to increase as long as production lags behind population growth. Last year, for example, the grain harvest at 6.8 million tons was quite good for Ethiopian conditions but that figure achieved the 1982 result once again. In other words, in the period during which the population increased by about 6 million, the food production remained unchanged.

That is the reason why in Ethiopia—different than in India, for example—droughts almost necessarily lead to famines: There are no reserves, no cushions that could prevent a reverse from becoming immediately a disastrous catastrophe. It is like a car without a crumple zone: Every accident may be fatal. That is particularly bad because the droughts have become more frequent. While in the past considerable droughts in Ethiopia occurred every 10 to 11 years, this cyclical phenomenon seems to have become a chronic one: the “drought of the century” occurred only 3 years ago and a comparable disaster is again at hand.

The revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa has done a few things to get the ecological problems underlying the nutritional crisis under control. It has instituted extensive soil conservation measures and it has started to fully utilize the largely unused possibilities of irrigation. In addition, it has started a resettlement program which is to provide for the people from the drought-prone, overpopulated north a new opportunity in the southwest regions which are still rather unpopulated, fertile and relatively assured of rain. But, the governments of the Western donor countries say, the Marxist rulers thus far have failed in the decisive factor: to create economic, especially agricultural reforms with the aim of creating production incentives for the farmers.

And precisely that, they say all the time, is the main reason for the development policy caution towards Ethiopia. That is the reason given by the Americans for providing any amount of humanitarian aid but no development aid. “It does not make any sense,” one of their officials in Addis Ababa said, “to put development money into Ethiopian agriculture when the general conditions are such that no production increase is to be expected.” The World Bank, too, has long ago stopped to involve itself in Ethiopian agriculture because it considers that a waste of time and money. It is not the West, it is argued in Washington and in European capitals, that blocks development aid to Ethiopia but the Ethiopian rulers who block the path to cooperation in the field of developmental policy—by a policy that neglects small farmers in favor of state farms, a policy that prefers collectivization, withholds price incentives and restricts free trade.

If that is in fact the principal reason for the development policy boycott of Ethiopia, then a completely new situation could arise in the near future. Namely foreign

economic experts in Addis Ababa think they can recognize clear indications that the regime is about to change its agricultural policy, though not fundamentally but to reorient it cautiously, more towards the market economy elements. At any rate it is certain that the government has been dealing intensively for some time with these questions. The things Western observers especially hope for from this opinion-forming process was formulated by one of them: Production incentives for small farmers by better prices, by an assortment of consumer goods and by the possibility of being able to sell the surpluses, after delivery of the prescribed state quotas, on the free market. Also welcomed would be lifting of controls on inter-regional trade between surplus areas and those with chronic deficits.

#### Far-Reaching Promises

If the rulers were really to move in this direction, that would of course no longer be so surprising. A movement away from traditionally socialist development models have been recognizable for some time. The current 10-year plan did provide for collectivization by 1993 of over half of the agricultural area under cultivation—but thus far it is only 5 percent and, in the opinion of experts on the country, nothing points towards a serious effort to reach the original goal. There is also a convincing reason for abandoning past guidelines: collectivization is very cost intensive. And as far as the notoriously uneconomical state farms are concerned, they are being critically examined while, on the other hand, an attempt is made to promote the small farmers with the help of services cooperatives.

However, the Western donors hoped for unambiguous signals—and they now believe they are near the goal. Some of them already speak of a coming “breakthrough,” which, if it really occurs, would immediately free million amounts of development funds. The EC is ready with \$100 million for a sizable agricultural project in Shoa Province and the World Bank, too, it has already said so, would be prepared to get involved in a big way in promoting Ethiopian agriculture. And thus the road would also be free for the bilateral donors, among which Italy has come forward with very far-reaching promises. Thus a ray of hope for Ethiopia after all? In the middle of a new hunger catastrophe a glimmer of hope: Thus are there perhaps chances for rehabilitating crisis regions such as Tigre so that they will also be able to endure periods of drought and offer a somewhat secure basis for existence—and not only an emergency seat at the abyss?

Nothing has been decided as yet. But even if accent on agriculture were to be changed and thus the road for increased cooperation with the West in development policy were to be opened—this would not be a cure-all. The civil war as well as the intolerably high birthrate are among the problems that only the Ethiopians themselves can solve.

### High Prices, Low Investment Hamper Economic Recovery

34200004 Hamburg *DIE ZEIT* in German  
8 Jan 88 pp 18-19

[Article by Bernhard Blohm: "Bitter Medicine; Rigorous Rehabilitation Policy in Ghana Shows Results"]

[Text] The maxim to the right next to the entrance to the department of economics of Legon University, the biggest school of higher learning in Ghana, is both challenge and hope. Feed the Naked—that is what someone sprayed on the wall there with green paint. It could have been the key sentence for the revolt of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings on New Year's Eve of the year 1981. For this military coup was the eagerly awaited step not only for the students in Legon but—with the exception of a small wealthy stratum of society—for the entire Ghanaian people to rescue the country from its desperate economic situation.

But the start of the new revolutionary government, of the Provisional National Defense Council, (PNDC), turned out quite badly. In the Western industrial countries the bearded flight lieutenant, always in pilot's uniform, combat boots, and always wearing a beret, was regarded as a kind of bogeyman, as the Che Guevara of the black continent. Nor did the close ties of the revolutionaries to Libyan chief of state Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi really contribute to set people's minds in Western countries at rest. The international banks stopped export financing to Ghana, they canceled still open lines of credit, and politicians hastily canceled long planned visits to Accra.

As early as his first radio address on New Year's Day 1982 Rawlings enlightened the citizens about his goals: In a long, revolutionary process the social, political and economic structures of the country were to be fundamentally changed. And the place where, in his opinion, the controls were to be first applied was clearly evident in the streets of Accra during the first days following the revolution: Soldiers threatened merchants with "revolutionary actions" if they did not voluntarily reduce their prices. Recalcitrants were given a sound beating and their goods were confiscated. At the gigantic Makola market in Accra and in other cities of the country the sales booths of the black marketers went up in flames. A Citizen Vetting Committee methodically hunted down rich citizens who had not paid their taxes; as a result of this action amounts running into millions are said to have been channeled into the state treasury.

But despite lofty revolutionary ideals, Thomas Siebold writes in his work on Ghana, the government lacked an economic-policy, a plan to solve practical problems. Thus, Siebold said, it took almost 5 months to find a new economics and finance minister. Not until May did Kwasi Botchwey, a lecturer at Legon University, certified as a Marxist, express his readiness to accept this position.

But such a concept would probably have become worthless anyhow, for two events threatened to kill the country completely. In July 1982 Finance Minister Botchwey vaguely spoke of a reconstruction and development program by which industry, foreign trade, and agriculture were to be helped. But then the big rain failed to materialize.

Corn, grain, and other agricultural crops withered in the dry soil and countless hectares of farmland fell prey to the flames. Brush fires destroyed rice fields, cacao and coffee plantations. In addition the harvest stored from the previous years burnt up in many farms. Impassable roads had made transporting the harvest to the cities impossible.

As a consequence Ghana at that time suffered a famine which people even now recall with horror. Daniel Kissi, a taxi driver in Accra, recounts that his 4-person family was able to have a meal only every other day. Long lines formed in front of the foodstands in the markets if bread, rice or grain were available for sale. "If that is compared with our country, then even the Americans in the most wretched slums of the big cities do not know what poverty is," an American missionary who has lived in Ghana for a long time recounts about this time.

And as if the neighboring country did not yet have enough problems, the Nigerian government decreed in January 1983 that all Ghanaians who had entered illegally had to leave Nigeria. Over a million Ghanaians lived and worked in Nigeria at that time. In the years before that, Nigerian government agencies and enterprises had advertised in Ghanaian daily newspapers for skilled workers, white-collar workers, and teachers. These ads as a rule carried the discreet hint that it is possible to work in Nigeria even without a visa.

But now the guest workers had to leave the country within 2 weeks. Within a span of a few weeks another million was added to the 12 million who had remained at home in Ghana. Practically overnight the Ghanaian population grew by 8 percent. As a point of comparison: In terms of FRG conditions, this would have meant an influx of about 5 million Germans. This would probably have confronted the far richer Federal Republic with problems that could hardly be solved.

One of those who had to leave Nigeria in a great hurry at that time is Steven Mensah, now 37 years old. From 1979 to 1983 he worked in the Nigerian capital of Lagos as an electrician. Since then he has been unemployed and, as he puts it, he stays passably above water by small jobs and odd jobs. Today, a day in November 1987, he waits in the evening on the terrace of Continental Hotel in Accra for a Canadian manager. He heard from friends that the manager's firm wants to enter the oil business in Ghana and perhaps it can use an electrician.

For 2-1/2 hours he walked from Kaneshie, west of Accra, to the city. After the end of the interview, perhaps around 9:00 pm, he must walk back there. He says he cannot afford a taxi or a bus. "Keep your fingers crossed for me that all goes well," Steven says when taking leave. He hopes for a salary of 7,000 to 8,000 cedis a month, which is about DM 70 to 80, and then he finally wants to have a family.

It is an open question whether utter poverty or understanding of the inevitability induced the revolutionary government to turn to the IMF. But as early as mid-1982 Botchwey secretly established contacts to the fund while socialist members of the government publicly still castigated the IMF as "financial monster," as "headquarters of imperialist monopoly capitalism which has not ever supported a revolution but has always tried to destroy revolutions in the interest of monopoly capitalism."

Nevertheless he reached an agreement in principle with the fund in the first half of 1983. IMF representatives and Botchwey signed in Washington a Memorandum of Understanding in which the Ghanaian Government accepted the economic-policy measures demanded by the fund and the IMF in its part promised financial support.

In this agreement the fund requested precisely all that it demands from all developing countries that want to get money from it:

- Expenditure discipline of the state and measures to reduce the budget deficit;
- a monetary and credit policy of the bank of issue directed towards stabilization of the price level;
- liberalization of the capital market;
- reduction of import restrictions;
- floating of the rate of exchange;
- deregulation of prices; and
- a liberal investment policy and an investment protection agreement for foreign investors.

Peru and also many other developing countries in the Third World heavily in debt do not want to swallow this bitter IMF medicine. They reject this catalog of measures and try on their own to make ends meet. Not so Ghana. This revolutionary government, which in its foreign policy acts in a socialist and anti-imperialist manner, rigorously implemented the required reform measures.

"Undoubtedly Rawling's biggest achievement is the fact that he finally has solved the problem of the grotesquely overvalued cedi," Kwasi Anyemedu, economics professor at Legon University thinks. "Neither I nor any of my

colleagues dared only to dream that he would tackle this problem so thoroughly." The flight lieutenant actually did that. While up to the military coup the dollar cost only 2.75 cedis, now the Ghanaians must pay 175 cedis for the greenback. Thus within barely 5 years since the end of 1982, the cedi lost 98.4 percent of its value or conversely the dollar has become almost 600 percent more expensive.

The actual floating of the rate of exchange—since September 1986 the latter is determined weekly by a dollar auction in the central bank—did not remain without effect on the country's economy. The demand for foreign exchange declined considerably; a visible sign of that is the fact that the dollar rate of exchange on the black market and the official rate of exchange are only 10 to 20 percent apart. In the heyday of the black market this gap was over 1000 percent.

As a result of the adjustment of the rate of exchange the economically absurd subsidizing of imports was also reduced and there was a healthy growth of exports. "In September we had greater foreign exchange reserves than we expected by our plans," says Abu Ahmad, chief economist of the Bank of Ghana, "now they are sufficient for 9 months; not too long ago there were only enough for a few days." He said the balance of payments has also improved and the rate of inflation this year will hardly be more than 10 to 15 percent.

But not only the central bank reports successes; the state finances also show a welcome development. Tax payments come in since the government uncompromisingly prosecutes tax cheats and on the expenditure side economizing is practiced, especially as regards personnel expenditures. The 1987 budget even includes a small surplus and the revolutionary government is probably the first one which in Ghana pays debts with the central bank and the commercial banks of the country. At any rate this was confirmed by the chief of the Bank of Ghana, K. Agama, at a meeting of banks in Accra in November: "The government no longer enlarges its debts in the banking system, on the contrary it pays off its credits." Thus a source of inflation and of deficit in the balance of payments, which has been bubbling for many years, is thus drying up, he said.

The consequences of this drastic cure: the economy of the country has been growing for 4 years and Professor Anyemedu is optimistic, believing "that Ghana will attain an economic growth of realistically 5 percent during the next 2 years, too."

However, there is no cause for euphoria. For, looking at it realistically, some question marks must be placed behind the optimistic prognoses.

There can be no doubt that in the past 3 years the upturn in the economy was provided by foreign capital. And this source must not dry up even though Anyemedu soberly analyzes that Ghana is not yet creditworthy again for

private banks to a larger extent. "We still depend for a few years on the help from the IMF, the World Bank and the governments in the industrial countries," Anyemedu felt, "and we further need debt relief."

But on this point opinions differ. Seung Choi, the representative of the World Bank in Ghana, does not believe that the total \$2.6 billion in foreign debts is too much for the country. "Ghana would now have no debt problem at all if it had handled foreign money more prudently and cautiously earlier," Choi says. He said that what is commonly understood to be the debt problem of the Third World does not apply to the situation in Ghana. "When we talk about that in Latin America, in that connection we refer to the problem of debts with the commercial banks, but they hardly play any role here," Choi stated, "credits from public sources, be it from governments or from multinational organizations, do not make the debt problem worse but they make it easier."

However, at least in one point the statement of the World Bank expert is not correct. Especially as a result of the IMF money injection the debt service quota, in other words the ratio of interest and amortization payments on foreign credits to export income, climbed to dizzying heights in past years. More than every other dollar earned in export must now and in the next few years be spent for debt service and over half of this quota is claimed by the IMF even though only roughly a quarter of the Ghanaian foreign indebtedness is owed to the IMF.

The reason: In principle, the IMF provides only short and medium term credits with a maximum due date of 5 years. The rates of amortization are correspondingly high. Ghana expert Siebold: "the medium-term IMF credits lead to a debt service burden that endangers the reconstruction." It is basically absurd to finance a long-term adjustment program with short and medium-term credits.

In another point, not unproblematic is the return to the market economy decreed by the IMF. The economic upturn and the liberalization of imports have tremendously expanded the offer of goods in Ghana. Foodstuffs are now available in adequate quantity and goods of all kinds are piling up on the markets—from Omo detergents to Turkish towels from Taiwan, to the latest color TV sets from Japan just shown at the Berlin radio and TV exhibition.

But for most Ghanaians these are articles completely beyond their means. The homemade inflation of the 1960s and the imported inflation as a result of the drastic devaluation of the cedi in the 1980s have greatly reduced the real income of the Ghanaians. Even according to cautious estimates it is now hardly any higher than almost 20 years ago. The legally stipulated minimum

wage this year is about 112 cedis a day, which is hardly more than a DM. A bricklayer earns about 200 cedis a day, an employee in public service perhaps 300-400 cedis.

That is too little to live and too much to die. That is shown if one visits Accra's Makola market and looks at the prices there: One kg of flour costs 250 cedis, a kg of sugar, 275 cedis. A yam root enough for one person for 2 days, can be obtained for 150 cedis. Five pieces of the basic foodstuff cassava, which feeds 3 persons, cost 100 cedis, a bottle of domestic beer costs just as much. "Formerly we had nothing to eat because there was nothing to buy," a worker said sarcastically, "now we have nothing to eat because everything is too expensive."

But even if the wage is enough for food, even simple articles of daily use have now become luxuries in Ghana. For a large package of matches, the bricklayer must now work half a day, a Turkish towel swallows up 2000 cedis, almost half a month's pay and most Ghanaians can only dream of a cheap car radio: It costs 28,000 cedis.

But not only the consumers suffer from the inflation and the drastic decline of the exchange rate, the cacao farmers, too, have their worries with it. It is true the cacao authority has considerably raised the producer price for cacao in 1987—from 85 to 140 cedis per kg, but that is not by far enough to make possible paying for the fertilizer or imported equipment that have become considerably more expensive. Last year a simple spraying device to destroy insects cost 5,000 cedis, but this year, 25,000 cedis. To put it another way: While a farmer had to sell about 58 kg of cacao in 1986 to be able to afford such a spraying device, this year he must deliver more than 3 times as much, 179 kg, in spite of the price increase for cacao.

In the Trade Union House of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in Accra, the umbrella organization of the Ghanaian trade unions, they probably do not want to talk about this bitter pill of the rehabilitation policy of the government and of the IMF—under a military government that would probably be a foolish venture. But it is only necessary to walk through the markets with open eyes to see that despite a plentiful assortment of goods, most Ghanaians can only afford the most essential items.

But the glaring opposite frequently can also be found in Accra. In the endless caravan of cars—the rush hour in the capital lasts from about 8:00 am until 8:00 pm—surprisingly many luxury cars from Great Britain and the FRG are slowly moving along, too. Obviously despite the revolution those who in the past have lived beyond their means frequently are not identical with those who now, as a consequence of the IMF rehabilitation policy, must tighten their belts. However, undisputed it may be that the revolutionary government has eliminated the

naked misery of the people by strictly adhering to the IMF policy, only little has changed in the income and financial differences unbelievable by European standards.

That would probably also not be possible at all in the present phase of construction. For the problem is not the wealth of a few Ghanaians but the lack of investment capital. "Much would be gained if these people would not invest their money abroad but would invest it here," a manager of the Ghana Investment Centre thinks, "but to do that they need confidence in the government's policy."

And not only domestic but also foreign investors can have confidence in the government's policy, the chief of the Investment Centre, Bentum-Williams, says with conviction. His agency will assist foreign enterprises in word and deed if they want to start up a business in Ghana. Even the biggest obstacle for German firms and banks, the absence of an investment protection agreement with the FRG, is to be eliminated in the near future. Such an agreement has been ready since 1967 but has not been ratified to this day. "We have asked the German ambassador to name the German negotiating delegation to get this matter finally settled," Bentum-Williams says.

But even more important for the future of the country appears to be the fact that more and more Ghanaians abroad are now considering returning to the homeland and to open there a small firm or business with the money they have saved.

For example, in January 1988 Ebenezer Hayfron-Benjamin wants to open a publishing house in the port city of Takoradi. He studied in Germany; he recalls that the students from Ghana at the time of their arrival at the Frankfurt airport in 1960 were greeted by Federal president Heinrich Luebke. He learned the publishing trade in Canada and there he was able to put aside enough money that he now dares to come back to Ghana.

One who has already dared to take this step is Bob Somiah. The master optician has a thriving business in Hamburg and about a year ago he opened a second opticians store in Cape Coast, a coastal town in Ghana's west. Somiah is the only optician in all of western and central Ghana; many of his customers come from towns and villages 200 or more kilometers from his house

located on a green hill outside the town. "Many believe that Rawlings has brought us here," Somiah says, "and in some way that is true. A few years ago we would not have dared to take this step."

But he is courageous even now. "Without my business in Hamburg," Somiah admits, we would not yet have been able to pull through but that must be viewed not only from the financial aspect." On the first day 110 customers came to his business which is equipped with the latest equipment and at the end of the day the equivalent of DM350 all told was in the cash register. For this amount, he together with his German wife, mended frames all day which in the FRG would have been immediately thrown into the garbage," ground lenses, examined eyes, and also once treated a case of conjunctivitis. Really not much can be left over after deducting the expenses.

But Somiah plans for the long pull. To start with he wants to help his compatriots and later on sometime also earn money—development aid in the best sense of the word. But whether his calculation works out, that depends not only on him but especially on how things develop in Ghana. But that will be decided by the IMF, the foreign creditors, and the governments in the industrial countries.

But the greatest responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Ghanaian government itself. If it succeeds in discarding the dark shadows of the past, Kalabule, as black market transactions and racketeering are called in Ghana, or at least to hold them within tolerable limits, then the chances for better times in the country of the rising star are not even bad.

But the path of virtue is narrow and difficult and dangers are lurking behind every bend in the road. Whoever may have started the rumor, the denial promptly followed in the official government publication DAILY GRAPHIC: The rumor had been heard, it was stated in the newspaper, according to which money from foreign credits end up in private accounts of members of the government. That is a disgraceful rumor, the paper said, and every Ghanaian who believes that seriously harms his country. Enemies of the government invent stories to discredit the revolution, the paper asserts.

Perhaps this is really so—it is hoped it is so.

**Project To Revive Agriculture; Priority Given to Food Crops**  
*34190009 Bamako L'ESSOR in French 29 Jan 88, p 4*

[Excerpts] By setting a goal to produce 1.6 million tons of rice over the next 3 years and 3 million tons of corn by the year 2000, the Ivory Coast now intends to focus seriously on the production of food crops, and to thus become the breadbasket of West Africa. The Government has just adopted a 3-year program to revive agricultural production centered on the development of food crops which should mean putting 100 million CFA francs into the rural sector from 1987-90. The economic situation in the Ivory Coast could according to some economists as well as demographers develop unfavorably if certain measures are not taken, especially in the economic sector. With a current population of more than 10 million inhabitants of which almost half are immigrants, and with an annual population increase of 3.1%, the population could approach 15 million by the year 2000. Unemployment in the urban sector which reached 30% of the active population over a national average of 11% risks becoming serious, even socially unbearable. To these somber prospects must be added the persistent drop in prices of export products, especially cocoa and coffee. This will create a shortage officially estimated at 350 billion CFA francs for the present campaign to overcome. This figure shows the scope of the risks that the country is running as long as its economy depends on industrial crops. In order to respond to the food needs of

the country and to export food to increase revenue for the rural population and to face unemployment problems, Ivorian leaders are envisaging a profound change in agriculture characterized by greater productivity. Also with an estimated production of 1.6 million tons of rice in 1990, the Ivory Coast which this year has the prospect of consuming an estimated 750,000 tons, should attain self-sufficiency in food. During the 1987-88 campaign 392,000 ha of rice will be cultivated, of which 182,000 will be supervised by specialized state institutions. As for corn, of which Ivorians expect to produce 3 million tons by the year 2000, 287,000 ha will be cultivated in 1987-88 for an expected output of more than 600,000 tons. Furthermore, the overall program for the production of cereal will be tested starting with 2 pilot projects over 15,000 ha, one in the North and the other in the center around Yamoussokro, along with corn, rice, and soy. The Yamoussokro project of which corn is the principal product, is two-fold involving 6,000 ha of industrial plants managed by an American institution in conjunction with Ivorian partners and 9,000 ha of privately owned crops. Out of these 9,000 ha close to 1,500 will be allocated to 300 young trainees as part of a policy aimed at ensuring relief for farmers. If the 3-year program to revive the Ivorian agriculture favors food crops, export products such as coffee and cocoa will not be neglected. All food or industrial crops will gradually be done by machine and farmers will benefit from a modern setting thanks to financing by the World Bank of 20 million CFA francs.

**RENAMO Representative in Portugal on Political Successes, Goals**

34420095 Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese  
19 Jan 88 p 28

[Interview with RENAMO representative in Portugal  
Manuel Frank, by A.M.Z; date and place not given]

[Text] Over 32,000 foreign combatants are participating in the civil war in Mozambique on the side of the government forces. The Cubans, numbering 12,000, constitute the largest contingent of "advisors" and "collaborators" available to Joaquim Chissano. Mozambican National Resistance [RENAMO] will fight for freedom as long as is necessary. These were some of the statements made to our weekly publication by Dr Manuel Frank, the RENAMO representative in Portugal, during an interview focusing on the main features of the situation in Mozambique after 10 years of popular insurrection against FRELIMO's [Mozambique Liberation Front] communist despotism.

Manuel Frank brought us, personally, some good news: that the Portuguese priest, Fernando Simoes Carvalho e Silva, captured by the guerrillas as he was travelling from Ressano Garcia to Moamba, a locality that is, moreover, not far from Maputo, would be released soon (as, in fact, he was, the following day). But his visit afforded us an opportunity for something more than news: an interview with the RENAMO representative who, naturally, began by discussing these cases of clergy (and not only clergy) captured by the Mozambican rebels. Nevertheless, "captured" is a term that the subject of the interview refuses to accept:

"Don't call them captives, because, in fact, they are not. If our combatants take with them the foreigners, whether they be missionaries or not, who are in the settlements that they attack, or in a column of vehicles that has succumbed to an ambush, it is basically so as to prevent the repetition of what has, unfortunately, occurred, and so that they will not run the risk of being killed by the enemy, with the usual intention of blaming us for crimes committed by FRELIMO."

"But that wasn't what happened to Father Fernando Simoes, who was captured while traveling alone...."

[Answer] Father Fernando was held under suspicion of being a FRELIMO collaborator. When his congregation, the Missionary Society, notified us of who was involved, his release was arranged immediately.

"We must admit that the solution to this case was remarkably quick. But we must also admit that there have been delays lasting for months in several other cases."

[Answer] It's true. There are delays when no government or institution shows the slightest interest in the release of the misnamed hostages. And there are delays when

FRELIMO raises obstacles to the release. While we wait for investigations to be conducted so as to restore them to freedom, we spare no effort to prevent those held from suffering any needless discomfort. To date, after their release, none of them, men or women, have complained of having suffered the least violence. All that they complain of is having taken long hikes, just as the combatants do.

[Question] It has been claimed that RENAMO is still holding four Portuguese. Is that true?

[Answer] I know of only one case, that of a Portuguese nun named Lucia, who is about to be returned to her congregation. In fact, the missionary, Gabriela Fragoso, of the Servants of Our Lady of Fatima, who returned to Portugal some weeks ago, claimed to know of the presence of four Portuguese in a RENAMO camp in Nampula Province. I only know of the case that I mentioned. I presume that the individuals cited by Sister Gabriela are Mozambicans of Portuguese descent, and that she has them confused with Portuguese.

**FRELIMO Controls Only the Cities**

[Question] From the particular, let's move to the general: the civil war itself. There is a widespread impression that, during recent months, RENAMO's offensive capacity has declined greatly; while, on the other hand, the control of territory by government forces has increased. What can the RENAMO representative tell us about this?

[Answer] I say that it is a completely erroneous impression. Mozambican National Resistance currently controls 80 percent of the country's territory.

[Question] Eighty percent seems exaggerated to us....

[Answer] You can believe it or not. I said control, I didn't say occupy. FRELIMO is only in control of the cities and the military posts. One can virtually only travel by air to move from one city to another safely. At night, it is not even safe to travel by road from Maputo to Matola; which is, as you know, a satellite city of the capital. The best proof of what I am telling you lies in the recent decision by the Red Cross, which stopped its food distribution, claiming that it was doing so "because of fear of the rebel activities."

[Question] The government, or pro-government, reports persist in talking about the recovery of the "Beira corridor."

[Answer] Well, they persist. With the very strong military support from Zimbabwe, it so happens that, sometimes, the operation of the oil pipeline, or of the communications with the border, or of the water and electric power supply to the city of Beira becomes normal. Yet these normalizations generally last for a week; but later, the periods of retrogression to the previous situation, of

retrogression to abnormality, last for months. So, we still consider the large investments planned or made in the "Beira corridor" by foreigners to be wasted money.

[Question] On the subject of military aid from Zimbabwe: As a reprisal, your movement had announced that it would also attack Zimbabwean territory, but it is not talking about this any longer. What is going on?

[Answer] It so happens that we are carrying out the threat. I mention to you, for example, RENAMO attacks made during the last 2 weeks of December on Zimbabwean localities such as Chimpila, Dangavuru, or Marandelas; the latter very close to Harare. For a long time, O DIABO has been calling the conflict devastating Mozambique an "international war," rather than a "civil war." The following statements made by Dr Manuel Frank concerning the foreign contingents operating in the service of FRELIMO confirm the designation "international war":

#### The Cubans Are Everywhere

"With its 18,000 well trained and well armed men, the Zimbabwean Expeditionary Corps is the largest foreign force that we have to confront. It is followed by the Tanzanians, nearly 10,000, who are also quite active. The government of Zambia, aware of its country's lack of military capacity, sent to Mozambique only 4,000 men, who avoid entering into combat and who bother us little or not at all. I would say the same of the symbolic presence of 350 soldiers that the government of Malawi detailed to protect the Cuamba branch line of the Nacala Railroad, who are there more to keep the relations between Malawi and the People's Republic of Mozambique balanced than for any other purpose."

And without leaving the area of foreign intervention, Manuel Frank provides us with more figures, showing that the Cubans are not in Angola alone:

"As for 'advisors,' who are of various nationalities, the Russians are in the majority, with 800, followed by the East Germans, with 300, and the North Koreans, with 300. But, including 'military advisors' and 'collaborators,' the majority belong to the Cubans, who are in nearly all sectors, in that of education and the administrative sector, and so forth."

[Question] And what about the other side of the coin?

[Answer] What do you mean?

[Question] I want to bring up to you a topic that is certainly delicate for RENAMO, that of the position assumed by the Republic of South Africa....

[Answer] Delicate? I don't know why. How many times must we say that the support from South Africa to RENAMO (support that existed at the outset, but was never so extensive as it was attempted to make people

believe) ended completely on 13 March 1984, that is, on the eve of the signing of the N'komati Accord by Samora Machel and Pieter Botha? Strangely enough, neither before nor after that date has anyone (not even the most imaginative FRELIMO propagandists) said that a single South African was found among the RENAMO combatants killed or captured, or South African weapons either, or, after N'komati, any vestige of intervention by the Republic of South Africa. It is ridiculous to talk about infiltrations from South Africa when RENAMO is operating in areas such as Tete and Zambezia, or those of the far northern provinces; areas which not only have a border with South Africa but also lie at enormous distances from that country.

#### The Prospects for Peace

It is not worthwhile persisting on this point, nor asking whether all the South Africans think and act regarding RENAMO as the Pretoria government thinks and acts, nor devising a question that would go unanswered, concerning the support substituting for that from the Republic of South Africa. But it is Manuel Frank who still has something to tell us about the N'komati Accord:

"Maputo sometimes still accuses South Africa of giving us aid. It is a maneuver that is part of the campaign against Pretoria activated by the 'Front Line' as a whole. But it is we who are entitled to make the opposite charge. The one that has had support from South Africa is FRELIMO itself, beginning with the maintenance of the Mozambican workers going to the Rand mines, just as they did before independence.

[Question] Do you think that South Africa might take this support for the People's Republic of Mozambique to the point of also supplying military forces to combat the guerrillas; specifically, to protect the Cabo-Bassa transmission line?

[Answer] I think not. But the conclusion that we have now reached is that the South African policy has an interest in perpetuating destabilization in Mozambique.

[Question] For the destabilization to end, it will be necessary to start with an end to the war. What prospects for peace can be viewed at present?

[Answer] Peace is within the reach of both sides. On our side, we only want to be on an equal footing. We do not accept being second-class citizens; nor do we want power for power's sake either. Both sides will have to make concessions. And while no willingness for this is evident on the part of Jorge Chissano, it does exist among some sectors on the government side, specifically, the military. They feel that peace is an absolute necessity, and know that we are not going to lay down our arms without being on an equal footing.

[Question] The absolute need for peace is increasingly the tone of the Mozambican bishops' pastoral letters. Does it appear to you that the Church may be the necessary intermediary?

[Answer] It seems so to us, provided that its appeals are understood by FRELIMO as they are understood by us.

#### There Is a Political Program

[Question] RENAMO's adversaries accuse it of not having a political program, and of being merely an insurrectional force. What should we think about this?

[Answer] RENAMO's political program is only ignored by those who want to ignore it maliciously, and deliberately. It has always existed, and at least 3 years ago it was made public; so as not to leave anyone with doubts. The goal of Mozambican National Resistance has always been and still is that of democratizing, liberalizing, and creating conditions for general progress. From a political standpoint, we want the eradication of the Marxist dictatorship system (but without a spirit of revenge), with the creation of a government of national harmony, the mission of which would be to pacify the country, establish a democratic order, and stabilize it; as well as the mission of preparing the conditions for social and economic recovery. With regard to the economy in particular, we shall not allow monopolies, oligopolies, nor economic exploitation of one class or sector by another class or sector. To us, the public sector and the private sector are collaborative and reconcilable interests. We shall not overlook the situation of the confiscated or seized assets, and their possible restoration. And much more...."

Manuel Frank goes on to assess the various points in the RENAMO manifesto approved 8 years ago which, in fact, calls for everything that may be considered a doctrine of government action. There is no space to go into detail, but it is worthwhile including this comment by the RENAMO representative:

"Perhaps we would not be exaggerating if we said that, of all the liberation movements, RENAMO is the one with the most complete and well defined political program. For example, has anyone been informed that the Afghan 'Mujahedin' also have a political program?"

#### How Long Fighting?

[Question] Since Dr Manuel Frank has mentioned the Afghan "Mujahedin" to us and that comment reminds us that they are divided into several groups, allow me to ask you what dissidence exists in RENAMO?

[Answer] What has existed is not ideological dissidence per se. No one would question that RENAMO is the only force fighting on the spot against FRELIMO's Marxism, and no one challenges Afonso Dlhakama as the head of our movement. Unfortunately, what there has been is

individual ambition or personal incompatibility. But this is inevitable. It exists everywhere, in all situations. As for other movements that sincerely want to contribute to the liberation and recovery of Mozambique, they should know that we have our arms open to anyone who wants to fight on our side.

[Question] You began by telling us that RENAMO's military situation has not worsened, contrary to what might be thought. And what about the area of foreign relations?

[Answer] It has not worsened either. We still have excellent, dedicated friends in many countries, despite the campaigns of disinformation initiated against us by the enemy.

[Question] Friends in many countries, but not in the respective governments....

[Answer] We never count on friendly governments....

[Question] Well, no. But the governments of nearly all the Western democracies, and the national or international financial institutions, are multiplying their expressions of support for the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique. Now, even Spain has decided to send Civil Guards to give antiterrorist instruction in Mozambique? What about that?

[Answer] Well, I think that Spain would do better to use its Civil Guards in the battle against terrorism in the Basque Country. But, as for the international backing given to FRELIMO, it has two explanations, which complement one another. On the one hand, FRELIMO is desperately seeking to make people forget about all the crimes that it has committed, all the human rights violations to which the various religious denominations, as well as foreigners and, in particular, the population of Mozambique itself, have been subjected so much. It is attempting to put into effect, desperately but also brazenly, all the points in the economic policy of the Mozambican National Resistance program. This is evident from a mere comparison between measures announced by Joaquim Chissano's government and the points in the RENAMO program.

[Question] In any event, it is receiving international credit....

[Answer] It is not just a matter of receiving credit. On the other hand, the fact is that all the foreigners, governments, individuals, or institutions offering or giving support to the People's Republic of Mozambique are worried, even though it may be with a view toward a distant future.

[Question] Can that future be very far off? How long can RENAMO continue the battle against the FRELIMO regime?

**Manuel Frank responds unhesitatingly: "Mozambican National Resistance will fight for freedom for as long as necessary."**

But he adds, with a smile, so that the interview may end with a little good humor, rather than optimism: "At least so long as FRELIMO exists. In other words, so long as we

can make use of the light and heavy weapons, vehicles, ammunition, and all the enemy equipment that falls into our hands, as it has up until now; and it is falling by the tons."

2909

**Portugal Enhances Military Cooperation**  
34420096a Lisbon *O JORNAL* in Portuguese  
22-28 Jan 88 p 32

[Text] In response to a request from the government of Sao Tome and Principe, Portugal is going to add a completely new dimension to its military cooperation with that African nation. Up until now, collaboration in defense matters, whether with Sao Tome and Principe, or with the other old Portuguese colonies, has been characterized by its lack of commitment.

The installation of Portuguese military forces, on a permanent basis, in a foreign country represents a great leap in our foreign policy.

For Sao Tome and Principe, the request made to Portugal, a NATO country, was also significant, especially since there are FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for Angolan Liberation) troops stationed in that country.

The date has not yet been set for the installation of a Portuguese CICA in Sao Tome and Principe. Before it is established, and within a short time, a military adjutant should be appointed to the country's embassy, and he will be in charge of the administrative and logistical preparations for the operation.

The Portuguese authorities finally appear to be ready to take a systematic, albeit careful, approach to the issue of military cooperation with the old colonies. With regard to Sao Tome and Principe, Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the situation is simpler, since these countries are at peace.

With regard to Mozambique, there are problems because of Renamo activities there and because of the regional and international involvement in the South Africa issue. Meanwhile, London, Paris and Madrid are all promoting military cooperation with Maputo, and, according to our sources, the Portuguese government is aware that it can no longer play the role of spectator. Until now, the traumas of the colonial wars and later independence created an attitude of great prudence with regard to Mozambique, especially on the part of the current president who was at that time prime minister.

However, at the end of this month, a Portuguese military mission headed by Brigadier Nascimento Garcia will go to Mozambique. According to several sources, Portugal could begin to participate in the recuperation of the Mozambican military apparatus. But the possibility has not been ruled out that such cooperation could assume the form of more direct involvement in military operations.

As for Angola, whose Army is already at a high degree of operational capability, although with a close collaboration with Cuban and Soviet military units, there is no

thought of cooperation from Portugal. Luanda will not even permit the assignment of a military adjutant at the Portuguese Embassy in Angola.

12857

**Editorial Comments on December Constitutional Amendments**  
34420096b Lisbon *DIARIO DE NOTICIAS* in Portuguese 11 Jan 88 p 6

[Text] The Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe has just complied with one of the requirements of its amended constitution, published in December by the People's National Assembly.

It is the creation of the position of prime minister, which has finally become part of the law of the land; it is a position to which the minister of state, education, and social welfare, Celestino Costa, has been named.

A lawyer and member of the Central Committee of the MLSTP (Sao Tome and Principe Liberation Movement), the only political party in the country, the new head of government is a part of the thrust toward "significant steps" in the process of political, social and economic democratization of the country.

For its governmental structure, the regime of this African republic had adopted the traditional principles of single-party dictatorship; but with the March 1985 changes in economic level (due to the breakdown of the production apparatus which had resulted from the collectivist model established after independence), it could be seen that other changes, including revision of the constitution, would be forthcoming. The situation required broad incentives for private industry, especially in the agricultural and commercial sectors.

The internal climate had deteriorated to such a degree that, with divisions within the party and desertions and the exile of important individuals, beginning with Miguel Trovoada, the only satisfactory solution consisted in actually rebuilding the small country. It is a country with few resources, a lack of trained manpower, and a level of mistrust among the people that threatened to worsen.

Against this backdrop, news began to circulate several months ago of a spectacular political turnaround involving universal suffrage and of direct and secret elections for the presidency and other government positions. It was clear that the intention was to give evidence to the world and to the country of an unequivocal commitment to democratization.

The expected turnaround, however, didn't go quite that far, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Posse da Costa hastened to explain. The single-party regime has been retained, allowing only for the formation of non-political

"social forces." It was these "forces" that the government emphasized; the change was actually only one toward "greater participation in political life." The desire to deepen the process of democratization was centered within the MLSTP and the presidency; more than one candidate could compete for the presidency, but the choice would be made within the party, and later submitted to the people in the form of a people's plebiscite. This kind of suffrage, according to the government, would grant popular legitimacy to the "already-legitimate" choice made by "party members."

The retention of a single political party was justified on the basis of "social and economic realities," and in order to offset any potential negative reaction the government has emphasized its "concern" in adhering to the principles of non-alignment, in sparing the country from "political and ideological cleavages," and, at the same time, guaranteeing abstention from either marxism or capitalism.

It was within this context that they proceeded to the amendment of the constitution, creating confusion in the organization of the government, and resulting in the creation of the post of prime minister. Meanwhile, what

has been observed is the first phase of a global change in the constitution, and a parliamentary commission has already been established to study other modifications.

This phasing process will perhaps allow for a testing of the changes, and it may also put pressure on "brother countries" that operate on a single-party system. For now, what stands out is a "brawny democratization," and a stalling for time.

This will be a period during which the way in which the prime minister exercises his role will have great significance for the future. But other factors will also be important to internal and external plans, from the most diverse political and economic developments to the evolution of a social climate, and the extent to which the adversaries of the current regime are successful in gaining support. And one other issue has unquestionable importance: Disarming the "dissidents" and setting the country to the task of functioning well in key sectors is the major challenge for the leaders of Sao Tome and Principe.

12857

## POLITICAL

### U.S. May Profit By AIDS Depopulation of Africa

34010022c Pretoria *DIE AFRIKANER* in Afrikaans  
4 Nov 87 p 5

[“If AIDS Depopulates Africa—U.S. Ahead in Race for Resources.”]

[Text] What is the U.S. Army looking for in the study of the spread of AIDS in black Africa? That question is being asked in informed circles after it became known that the American Army has set up a special unit in Nairobi, Kenya, to determine how far black Africa is going to be depopulated as a result of that disease. According to newspaper reports, the unit is under the command of a general in the American Army's medical corps, Philip K. Russel. The second-in-command is an epidemiologist, Dr Bruce Johnson. The unit is directly subordinate to the chief of research of the U.S.'s medical corps at Fort Detrick, Frederick [sic], Maryland.

#### Depopulation

It is assumed among whites in Nairobi that not only the U.S., but also Russia and India are very thoroughly aware of the strategic implications of the possible depopulation of large parts of black Africa, which include Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zaire. It is here that an important part of the world's important mineral reserves are located, including copper, high-grade iron ore, diamonds, cobalt, manganese, uranium, chromium and easily accessible coal.

#### Minerals

The Americans in Nairobi have openly said that their country will jump in first if the depopulation is going to lead to a power vacuum. Indians in that city are already dreaming of the settling of many thousands of Indian immigrants in East Africa. It is expected that Russia, which is being kept informed by Cuban sources, will try to get the jump on the Americans.

The minerals of the strategically extremely important Tete Triangle in Mozambique are already playing a big role in the communist countries' policy toward Mozambique and in the American refusal to recognize Renamo, which is suspected of having ties with the SA Defense Force. Rightist political circles in Pretoria characterize as alarming the innocence with which the SA Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, disregards the strategic importance of Tete and all of Mozambique. How much longer will the government be blind to the implications which a new race for Africa will have for South Africa?

### UK MP Favors Recognizing Bophuthatswana Independence

34010021d Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
7 Dec 87 p 10

[Text] At Saturday's celebration of the 10th anniversary of Bophuthatswana independence, British MP Mr Michael Colvin said that he will do everything possible to help gain international recognition for Bophuthatswana.

Mr Colvin said that he supports the government of Bophuthatswana and feels that that country will be recognized internationally once South Africa “puts its house in order.”

Reform in South Africa will have to take place more quickly, he said. South Africans feel that reform is taking place quickly, but other countries see things differently and feel that it is going at a snail's pace.

Mr Colvin conveyed his government's best wishes to President Lucas Mangope and to the inhabitants of Bophuthatswana, saying that his country is well aware of the successful attempts by President Mangope to establish a democratic country.

Mr Colvin said that he already has the signatures of 80 members of the British House of Commons who support him in his attempt to grant Bophuthatswana international recognition.

As soon as he has a hundred signatures, the British government will certainly have to pay attention to Bophuthatswana.

12271

### Mbeki's Conduct Seen as Preempting Mandela's Release

34010019b Johannesburg *DIE VADERLAND* in Afrikaans 17 Dec 87 p 16

[Text] Sometimes it is necessary to choose the lesser of two evils. This is the position in which the government has been placed as a result of the insolent behavior of Mr Govan Mbeki and the radical henchmen of the ANC.

They know very well that Mr Mbeki's release—for humane reasons—is also a test case. If he had maintained a low profile, if he had striven for peace and stability in this country and for discussion, it would have perhaps been possible to consider releasing the ANC leader, Mr Nelson Mandela.

Instead, he and his fellow travellers chose the path of inflaming the revolutionary climate. He himself declared that he is still a member of the ANC, that he is still a communist, and that he still supports the ANC's goals and methods.

The ANC is not interested in negotiation, aside from an unconditional transfer of all power to that organization. It continues to strive for revolution. And there is not the slightest indication that it is prepared to renounce violence.

Thus, President P.W. Botha and his government have no choice. There can no longer be any talk of releasing Mr Mandela. Mr Mbeki and his radical friends have themselves passed judgement on him through their behavior. And on themselves as well.

Even if actions against Mr Mbeki generate criticism and negative publicity, this is the lesser evil compared to the harm that he is in the process of inflicting.

12271

**ANC Arusha Declaration Calls for More Violence**  
34010021b Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*  
7 Dec 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Arusha"]

[Text] The recent ANC conference in Tanzania, and the so-called Arusha Declaration issued there, will hopefully serve as an eye-opener for those people who still think that this terrorist organization wishes to play a peaceful role in a changing South Africa.

The ANC is playing a guitar with one string on it: no negotiation, unless the goal of it is the transfer of power. And intensified violence and campaigns to isolate South Africa economically and diplomatically until it negotiates according to ANC conditions.

This ongoing attempt to win the world over to its policy of violence is a pathetic display by an organization that in its 75 years of existence has been unable to bring about a single constructive thing, but continues to claim sanctimoniously that it can save South Africa.

Aware of the support that it is losing on the international level, one would expect that it would come forward with something new in order to polish up its fading image a bit. This was in fact the purpose of the conference.

But no, the only thing that it asks for is more violence, more sanctions and a more effective isolation of South Africa; thus, more innocent blood and greater unemployment and poverty. No wonder that only Russia and African countries support the ANC. The former wants to see disorder in which it can take control, while the latter know nothing other than chaos.

The reality is that South Africa has committed itself to orderly power-sharing. It wants to expand democracy through peaceful negotiation. It is not carrying out reforms because it has been forced to do so, but because

it believes that evolutionary adjustment is the solution. Those on the Left and Right who see this as weakness or concession under pressure are living in a dream world.

12271

**AWB Expansion Into Namibia Announced**  
34010023a Pretoria *DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans*  
13 Jan 88 p 1

[Article: "Vote Along With HNP on Southwest. AWB Also in Southwest."]

[Text] The AWB's decision to expand into Southwest [Namibia] is a significant new development in rightist politics in Southwest and South Africa, which can have broad repercussions, observers say. According to DIE SUIDWESTER, Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche, the leader of the AWB, announced in Windhoek that this movement is also now going to establish itself in Southwest. It will also be extended in Southwest as a popular liberation movement for Afrikaners, he said.

Mr Terre'Blanche was in Windhoek along with the AWB's deputy leader, Mr Jan Groenewald, Professor Alkmaar Swart and Dr Chris Jooste. He said that his movement is going to endeavor to get an Afrikaner territory in Southwest, which can secede from Southwest and join an Afrikaner state in South Africa. Mr Terre'Blanche attacked the government and pointed out that its acceptance of UN Resolution 435—which implies a one-man-one-vote election in Southwest—boils down to the acceptance of a black regime in Southwest and eventually a Swapo regime. That is not acceptable to Afrikaners.

The secretary of the HNP in Southwest, barrister Sarel Becker, responded to Mr Terre'Blanche's statement and said that the AWB's position on Southwest is identical to that of the HNP. The HNP is likewise trying to get a white territory in Southwest, without the black areas, which must unite with a white state in South Africa. The HNP also rejects UN Resolution 435 totally, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Interim Government in Windhoek, arising from it. The National Party of Southwest, which has an alliance with the Conservative Party in South Africa, has on the other hand accepted the principle of negotiation politics in Southwest on the basis of the UN's resolution and the Charter of Fundamental [Rights]. Barrister Becker said that the AWB can indeed not be opposed to the HNP's position on the future of Southwest and suggested that the AWB in Southwest should logically support the HNP, seeing that there are no differences of principle and the HNP has been firmly established in Southwest for a long time.

13084

**Hendrickse's 'Confrontation Policy' Criticized**  
34010023c Cape Town *DIE BURGER* in Afrikaans  
5 Jan 88 p 8

[Editorial: "Political Maneuvering Room"]

[Text] It goes without saying that the best interests of the country—and continued reform—are not served by confrontation politics. It is therefore gladdening to learn from Mr Peter Hendrickse, the Labor Party's national public relations officer, that the party is not bent exclusively on confrontation with the government. On the face of it, however, it is difficult to reconcile Mr Hendrickse's statement with certain decisions which were made last week at the Labor Party's national congress in Pretoria. Thus, the congress—the highest party body—has now made it party policy that the summary abrogation of the Group Areas Act is a condition for the Laborites' cooperation in postponing the Volksraad election from 1989 to 1992. One can understand the fact that the party feels particularly strongly about the Group Areas Act, which it regards as a highly discriminatory measure. Nor is anyone denying it the right to try to get the law repealed, as it has, for that matter, been doing for a long time. But by taking such an implacable position on this matter—and elevating it to official party policy—it has left itself little, if any, maneuvering room to negotiate further with the government on the matter.

The government has repeatedly shown that it is not unapproachable concerning the Group Areas Act, despite the political implications which this has for it. The measure has been amended and accommodated on numerous occasions while a few months ago the government held out the prospect of further radical changes—among other things, adoption of the principle of open areas. On that occasion the government also explained in detail why the law cannot be repealed in its entirety.

It is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that the Labor Party has now surely painted itself into the corner over the matter. It has evidently now slammed the door shut on any further negotiation on the measure. It may benefit from some temporary popularity by this, but the greater cause of consensus politics—a cornerstone of the constitutional dispensation in which the party is participating—can suffer damage. The sooner it realizes that by its action it is in reality benefitting the far rightists, the better.

13084

**Mangope Promises To Create Example of Democracy**  
34010021c Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
7 Dec 87 p 10

[Text] At a news conference Saturday in Mmabatho, President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana said that he is not interested in becoming part of South Africa again—not in the form of a federation nor through any other political arrangement.

President Mangope was reacting to questions from the foreign media who wanted to know whether there was not a possibility that Bophuthatswana could in the future become part of Botswana.

President Mangope said that that was certainly possible, although he is not giving it any thought right now.

On apartheid, he said that his country would like to see the abolition of that system in South Africa. In his country, apartheid was abolished within 2 years after independence.

President Mangope said that he planned to surprise the world with his country's development in the coming decade. His country is rich in strategic minerals and has good agricultural potential.

He wants the world to know that Bophuthatswana is a Christian country that believes in the spirit of free enterprise. His country is a democratic one, and people who do not believe this are welcome to come take a look for themselves.

In his speech earlier that day at celebrations of Bophuthatswana's 10th anniversary of independence, Mangope said that the reforms already carried out in South Africa were inconceivable only 5 years ago.

In his opinion, economic reform in particular is important to solving South Africa's problems. Businessmen from Bophuthatswana realize now that they must work to ensure that the system of free enterprise survives after apartheid.

12271

**Marais on Need for Rightists To Cooperate**  
24010019c Johannesburg *DIE VADERLAND* in Afrikaans 1 Dec 87 p 4

[Article by Madelaine Page: "Jaap Begins Campaign and Says: 'CP Can Learn a Lesson in Schweizer'"]

[Text] Pretoria—If the National Party wins the by-election in Schweizer-Reneke, it will not even cause a ripple on the political surface, says Mr Jaap Marais, the leader of the Reconstituted National Party and his party's designated candidate there.

"It could indeed have a positive effect in that the Conservative Party might realize that it will never be able to fight the NP on its own, without the cooperation of the HNP."

This, he says, will result in greater realism concerning the struggle of the Afrikaner opposition.

"If there had been cooperation between the two parties to the right of the NP, the NP would have had to throw in the towel in advance.

"However, the CP chose to not cooperate with the HNP, and now it must pay the price for it."

The participation of the two rightist political parties will by necessity strengthen the chances of the NP, but Mr Marais feels that a landslide is out of the question. The campaign will end neck-and-neck.

"The HNP is the party that has been fighting the NP for 20 years now. It is thus our duty to be in the race."

"If my entering the race means that the NP will win, then it is of little consequence. One more NP and one less CP representative will make no ripples on the political surface."

However, if the HNP wins, an entirely new political situation will be created, he says, because this would be the biggest injection of morale that could be given to the Right.

This would naturally create the foundation for a new relationship between the CP and HNP.

Mr Marais left today for Schweizer-Reneke, where he wants to get started with organizing for the election. His party decided to open up more than one office, since the electoral district is so spread out.

—The executive committee of the HNP is also to decide this week whether it will run a candidate for the by-election in Standerton. If it decides to do so, the candidate will probably be Mr Attie Treurnicht, the organizing secretary of the HNP.

12271

**Gumede on Uncontrollable Factions Within UDF**  
34010027a Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
17 Jan 88 p 24

[Summary of interview with United Democratic Front Co-President Archie Gumede conducted by LEADERSHIP: "If I Cannot Control 10-Year-Olds..."; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In an interview with LEADERSHIP, a co-president of the United Democratic Front, Mr Archie Gumede, sheds some light on the problems of the UDF leaders with controlling their organization, with differences of opinion on strategy and with negotiation. What follows is an abridgement of the interview.

The UDF simply does not have the machinery to supervise the activities of its affiliated organizations, says Co-President Archie Gumede in response to a question from LEADERSHIP concerning why the leaders do not put an end to the violence in Natal.

The reason: In the loose federal structure of the UDF, each affiliated organization is completely autonomous. And the leaders are so widely dispersed that it is difficult to get everyone together to vote on an issue.

To the question concerning whether he and Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu will be able to get together and devise a way out of the violence in Natal, his answer will have to be, "No, the structure of the UDF does not permit me to do so without a mandate."

But it is evidently not only the structure of the UDF that makes leadership in that organization difficult. Mr Gumede talks openly in the interview about differences of opinion in the organizations and the impatience of the radicals towards people who differ with them.

The ordinary members of the affiliated organizations, he says, are tolerant towards differences of opinion and are in favor of an exchange of ideas. But there are many influential radicals in the UDF who do not tolerate this. When he said recently in a heated exchange of ideas about violence that the solution will have to be sought in the Black residential areas, because there are no victims in the white areas, he was accused of racism.

"I find that the leaders in that group (the radicals) very much tend to want to force others to adopt their opinion," he says.

And he believes that this tendency is not good for a future democratic system in South Africa. What hinders him, he says, is that more people opposed to these undemocratic methods are not joining the UDF. Because if they do not do so, the leaders will be automatically chosen from the ranks of those who believe in coercive measures.

"For example, there are those who regard others who do not participate in a work boycott—whether they knew about it or not—as the enemies of the people, and say that these people must be 'steamrollered'.... This is the sort of thing that we oppose. After all, we have suffered a great deal from being 'steamrollered' by the white government...."

Last year, Mr Gumede was accused of wanting to split the UDF when he proposed that the organization participate in the three-chamber Parliament, with the goal of destroying it. Responding to a question of whether participation is currently being discussed by the UDF, he says:

"No. Other matters are demanding our attention, so that we cannot sit down and discuss this. Discussions will depend on how the government handles its own program. If its program leads to a crisis, we will handle the crisis and then devote our attention to the next issue."

"I would very much like to discuss these questions, including the one of our attitude towards coercion, but we cannot do so until we have enough time for it."

To the question of whether the UDF can hope to make progress as long as it is unwilling to talk to the government, because its leaders are in jail or abroad, Mr Gumede raises a counterquestion: Can the government solve its problems without talking to these leaders?

"Both sides have to want to talk. And the only people with whom it is worthwhile to talk are those who can deliver results after an agreement has been reached. Now, it does not help for me to pretend that I can deliver results if I am unable to control 10-year-olds....

"You see, we believe that the only people who can enter into a meaningful agreement are those people, the ones in jail. Mandela, Sisulu.... It is they who will be able to convince the people to compromise on important issues."

The UDF leaders, he says, can forget about pragmatism. They are fooling themselves if they believe that they can be pragmatic. But there is still room for Mandela and the ANC leader, Oliver Tambo, to be pragmatic.

Mr Gumede is unambiguous in his rejection of the proposed National Council. If there were time, this would have been good, he says, but "time is working against us." This was still possible in 1948 and in 1960, but not today.

And then the question thus far left unanswered: What exactly are the UDF's alternatives? The "progressive movements" are accused of spending more time criticizing the existing system than thinking of alternatives. And in the meantime, most people have a very distorted idea of what the new South Africa ought to be.

Mr Gumede says that he agrees. "But I cannot say that we can avoid that situation under our particular circumstances. We are on the run, and we are trying to be creative at the same time."

"However, I am really becoming very concerned that we truly going to end up in a stew sooner or later because people do not have enough time to think and to discuss the various issues and possibilities."

Is there any practical way in which the present stalemate can be ended?

"Well, this was put to P.W. Botha when the white voters expressed a motion of confidence in him. The key is in his hands; he himself used that expression. It is within his powers to accept the hand of friendship from Mandela and the other leaders who have the confidence of the people.

"However, I wish to emphasize that the solution lies not only with Mandela and people like him, but also in cooperation between people in whom the whites have confidence and people who have the confidence of the blacks. In a situation like this, you can genuinely hope that the future of the country will be worth the trouble, so that all the people can look forward to it."

12271

**Treurnicht Defends CP's Relations With AWB**  
34010027b Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
26 Jan 88 p 2

[Article based on report by A.J. Rossouw: "Dr T. Does Not Repudiate the AWB"]

[Text] Balfour—Conservative Party leader Dr Andries Treurnicht said yesterday evening that he is not willing to repudiate people who, just like himself, simply have an aversion to the "sell-out policy" of the government.

In an extremely defiant speech before more than 500 people in the Balfour city hall, he again spelled out and defended his party's relationship to the extremist Afrikaner Resistance Movement.

Dr Treurnicht said that he is not a member of the AWB, but he believes that the AWB will one day, after the CP comes to power, be a "purely cultural organization."

He has spoken with the leaders of the AWB and asked pertinent questions concerning the organization's policy and principles, and he received satisfying answers.

He has no intention of condemning people who agree with him about the free perpetuation of the Afrikaner and the interests of the white man in his own fatherland.

"I am not willing to condemn them without qualification," he said.

The Transvaal leader of the National Party, Mr F.W. de Klerk, is raising such a rumpus about the AWB simply because he knows that its members vote for the CP. Dr Treurnicht said that the NP was successful in the election by linking the ANC to the PFP. Now it wants to link the AWB with violence and hang the AWB around the CP's neck.

These attempts by the NP are futile, he said.

Concerning disruptions of meetings, Dr Treurnicht said that the NP should simply look at its own behavior in the past.

In his day, President P.W. Botha himself stood up at his political opponents' meetings and demanded that a new chairman be elected. Mr De Klerk's father, Senator Jan de Klerk, once ordered the current CP member of Parliament for Nigel, Mr Carel Schoemann, to go disrupt an opposition meeting.

"You cannot reproach me for the disruption of meetings. The NP itself has done the same thing in an expert manner," he said.

12271

**Stofberg Encourages HNP Members To Join CP**  
34010027c Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
18 Jan 88 p 7

[Text] Volksrust—Saturday was "show day" here at the fairgrounds of this southeast Transvaal town—one could almost call it the Conservative Party's "Big Brag."

There was almost shameless boasting about the CP's latest catch: Mr Louis Stofberg, former head secretary of the HNP and the man occasionally referred to by CP leader Dr Andries Treurnicht as a *rara avis* (rare bird).

It was here at the CP carnival that Mr Stofberg appeared in public as a speaker for the first time since he joined the CP 2 weeks ago.

As expected, he was well-received by the CP supporters, because this is what they needed to deal the final blow to the HNP in the upcoming by-elections.

Mr Stofberg did not speak long, but he was loudly cheered when he said, "If other HNP members knew how nice it is to join the CP, they would not wait until tomorrow, they would go ahead and do it now!"

Mr Stofberg also told of the close tie that existed as early as in 1986 between him (as HNP member of Parliament for Sasolburg) and the CP members of Parliament. "The other parties could not even manage to drive the point of knife between us," he said.

He also had praise for the CP leadership, which at no point expected him or his wife to repudiate anything in his political past before he could join the party.

From events here, it is clear that Mr Stofberg will be used as the CP's "show horse" on numerous occasions in the 6 weeks remaining before the by-elections in Standerton and Schweizer-Reneke in order to coax away as many HNP supporters as possible.

Saturday he was displayed together with Mr Werner Weber, ex-NP member of Parliament for Wakkerstroom, who then became an HNP member as well and then in turn left that party last year to join the CP.

He, too, made a fervent appeal to HNP members to join the CP.

12271

**HNP Future Temed 'Bleak'**

34010023b Cape Town *DIE BURGER* in Afrikaans  
8 Jan 88 p 10

[Text] It is certainly another nail in the coffin of the Herstigte Nasionale Party that Mr Louis Stofberg has just hammered in. The defection of Mr Stofberg, until recently general secretary of the HNP, to the Conservative Party [KP] is a reconfirmation that the HNP's future is bleak. It will not be surprising if more HNP supporters join the KP after this. There were already signs in the arguing between the two rightwing parties before last year's election that ordinary members of the HNP were fervently hoping that an agreement could be reached. Mr Stofberg's joining the KP may be the incentive for them too to turn their backs on the HNP. Moreover, Mr Stofberg was a key figure in the HNP. Besides being general secretary, he was the first MP in nearly two decades who was able to win a seat under the HNP banner. Now the HNP leader, Mr Jaap Marais, is standing almost alone in the vanguard. His support may crumble further if he fares poorly in the coming by-election in Schweizer-Reneke.

Mr Stofberg's joining the KP was expected, as was the jubilation with which he was welcomed by the KP leader, Dr Andries Treurnicht. It is a big catch for the KP from HNP ranks. But there is a question as to whether Mr Stofberg had any other choice while he still clearly has aspirations in rightwing politics. Dr Treurnicht says the KP and Mr Stofberg worked so well together in the Volksraad. That is also to be understood, for, since its founding, the KP has without a blush filched one HNP principle after the other.

13084

**HSRC Book Analyzes May Election Results**  
34010021e Cape Town *DIE BURGER* in Afrikaans  
9 Dec 87 p 14

[Article by Dawie under the rubric "From My Political Pen": "Aftershock from Election Continues: HSRC Book Confirms Pattern"]

[Text] The outcome of the House of Assembly election on 6 May surprised so many South Africans that the aftershock is still being felt. Now, 7 months later, the Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC] is offering a calmer look back on the election with a book in which a number of scholars and others evaluate the outcome.

It is interesting because in this publication ("South African Election 1987") the outcome is looked at from various angles—including through the eyes of non-whites and of a far-rightist SABRA representative. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement in the book that the election showed more than one distinctive feature.

First of all, most of the writers agree that there was in fact a swing to the right among white voters. The SABRA man claims that 35 percent of the votes in Transvaal and the Orange Free State—which account for 60 percent of the voters—were cast for the CP.

And Nationalists in the northern provinces acknowledge that support for the NP has subsided. A Colored writer in the HSRC book even speaks of a "massive swing to the right."

#### "Massive Swing"

Secondly, most writers agree that the NP's strong performance in the election was to a significant degree due to the large number of English-speaking voters who voted for that party. According to an analysis within PFP ranks that is cited, between 53 and 55 percent of all English-speaking voters cast their ballots for the NP.

But to say, as some of the writers do, that this swing from the PFP to the NP took place primarily because the NP focused the election on security issues alone is an oversimplification. The NP specifically requested a mandate to negotiate a new constitutional system, and this theme was repeatedly emphasized during the election campaign.

Apparently, the voters have strong reservations about the way in which reform should take place, and for that reason they emphatically rejected the radical policy.

#### Reservations

For example, one writer notes that most white voters accept that reform is necessary and inevitable. "What they find unacceptable is reform that jeopardizes stability and security or that will lead to a takeover of power by radical forces."

Furthermore, the lack of enthusiasm for the Independents shown by the various writers is striking. And at least one of the academic commentators was closely associated with the Independents during the election. He now says that it must be remembered that Helderberg, Stellenbosch and Randburg are not typical electoral districts.

#### "Political Farce"

An Indian scholar on the Independents: "The failure of the Independents to create practical principles due to personality clashes, ego politics and differences in goals and strategy turned what was intended to be a political force into a political farce."

The most important conclusions that are drawn agree largely with what was published after the election in this column and in editorials in DIE BURGER. In all truth, this is a reaffirmation of those positions. (Incidentally, DIE BURGER is the only newspaper whose commentary is included in the HSRC book by way of a summary that comprises one chapter.)

In terms of the future, the question arises of whether the polarization of extremism in South African politics that took place in the election—to the left and to the right—is of a permanent nature, and in particular whether the far-rightist parties have further potential for growth.

A Black writer feels that it is unlikely that the National Party will regain the votes that it has lost to the Right. Another believes that the CP could win the next general election of the number if the number of electoral districts remains the same and the boundaries do not change. Yet another feels that the Right has reached its ceiling.

#### AWB "Romantic"

It is warned that the role of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement [AWB] should not be underestimated. The AWB is described as "romantic, racist and sensationalist," and it is noted that it could perhaps become the instrument and opportunity for far-rightist extra-constitutional activities if they should so choose.

At the same time, there is little hope that the PFP will recover from the blow that it received in and after the election.

Thus, when all is said and done, only the National Party remains, imperfect though it may be. As one writer says, the voters view the NP as the "only viable political instrument that they have in the bargaining process for political power." And for the continued maintenance of law and order.

This is not the only lesson of the 1987 election, but it is certainly an important one.

**Arguments in Favor of General, Municipal Elections in October**  
34010019a Johannesburg *DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans* 2 Dec 87 p 12

[Article by Gert Kotze under the rubric "On Close Inspection": "Vote Now and Be Done With It"]

[Text] It has been said in the past that South Africans are tired of voting.

This idea can now be broached for next year's municipal elections as well.

After all, this will be nothing more than another general election under a different guise. With the same positions on reform and the same repudiations and the same main figures. And perhaps the same voter list.

All the more reason for the question to arise: Why not just have a general election and the municipal election on the same day?

Good arguments can be made in favor of this type of double-door voting.

—Not the least of which is the aspect of cost.

The costs of printed propaganda, of holding gatherings and of spending precious time are all factors to be considered.

Why duplicate the same processes with more or less the same expenses a year or so later by holding a subsequent general election, which can no longer be put off for very much longer anyway?

—As things stand, the next election should be held in 2 years, because the Rev Allan Hendrickse has an ax to grind with the state president.

That quarrel, and the Labor Party leader's irreconcilable attitude since then, can only become more detrimental to the government and the National Party as time goes on.

These days, the Rev Hendrickse is having problems with delusions of grandeur. He is using key provisions of the Constitution in an attempt to manipulate the state president and the government.

Why let him feel so important? Use the organization of the municipal election for a general election and eliminate the constitutional checkmate that is currently hanging over everyone's head.

This could also remove another annoying obstacle.

It is the annoying fact that the CP is currently running around saying that Allan Hendrickse is in the process of making the state president into a political hostage.

—This raises a second argument in favor of a double-door election next October.

The saying that a lie repeated enough comes to sound like the truth is currently being used as strategy by the Conservative Party.

And this is not about the Rev Hendrickse. There is a dangerous racist element in CP propaganda to the effect that P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk and Pik Botha are working to send this country down the road of total integration.

Watch out, the doors to your schools will be thrown open, and your white neighborhoods will cease to be white. Gray neighborhoods are going to spring up like mushrooms. And we will have a black president.

This is the thrust of the daily stream of propaganda coming from the CP.

For the National Party, this creates a dilemma, because it is being slowly forced to react instead of act. A few days ago, yet another minister had to hastily issue an official denial after a set of untruths was uttered.

It is impossible to gain ground with that type of defense.

In view of the fact that once again everything possible will have to be done next October during the municipal election campaign—just like last May—to expose the grand lies, why wait a year to do the same thing again?

—And speaking of the CP, this party and many of its supporters are beginning to increasingly exhibit the same sort of delusion of grandeur as the leader of the Labor Party. They believe that their triumph is just beyond the horizon.

Let them show whether this is in fact the case in October 1988. Transform the defense into an attack, and let them fight on all fronts. Test them once and for all with power and opinion. If not, the same battle will simply have to be fought a year or so later.

—A final argument.

The South African voter is not very excited about another round of voting. His (justified) complaint is that he clearly indicated his mandate in the referendum and again on 6 May.

This was a mandate for reform.

Perhaps the voter is able to start believing that reform must take place, but each time he waits for one more election. And he can also believe that, as a means of protest, he will never have to vote again.

What is necessary is the alternative to the current constitutional impasse. The alternative that must show that the leftist and rightist claims and positions are not feasible.

As long as there is procrastination and doubt about the general election, this alternative will remain elusive. And the chance that all the lies will be proclaimed the truth becomes greater as time goes on.

—In fact, there is no good argument in favor of postponement until after October 1988.

12271

## MILITARY

**Capability of Firing Nuclear Warhead With 155-MM Cannon Asserted**

34010025b Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*  
15 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by Thinus Prinsloo: "SA's 'Atomic Bomb' Possibly Fired by Cannon"]

[Text] London—South Africa and Israel have developed a new type of nuclear weapon. It can be fired with a cannon and be of great value in a conventional war, according to a book that will soon be distributed.

An Israeli scholar, Mr Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, alleges that because South Africa and Israel are regarded as world outcasts the two countries began to realize in the early 1960s that they need tactical nuclear weapons.

The development of this weapon, which can be fired from a 155-mm cannon, began at that time.

This caliber is used by the formidable G5 and G6 cannons that are manufactured in South Africa. The cannons have a range of more than 30 km.

Mr Beit-Hallahmi alleges that it is almost certain that the flash of light detected off the coast of South Africa by American spy satellites in 1979 was caused by testing of this weapon.

At that time, there was a great deal of conjecture in various countries concerning what could have caused the flash.

Mr Beit-Hallahmi alleges that the weapon was developed after South Africa obtained enriched uranium and Israel provided the scientific know-how. According to him, there are particularly good relations between the two countries.

—It was recently alleged in the British press that Great Britain is using uranium from South-West Africa in developing its Trident nuclear missiles.

The British cabinet reportedly decided in 1976 to import 1,100 tons of uranium oxide. Then Prime Minister Mr Harold Wilson was in favor of this step.

12271

**Explosives Factory Back in Production**  
34010027d Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*  
25 Jan 88 p 7

[Excerpts] The explosives factory in Ekandustria, near Bronkhorstspruit, at which five people were killed last year in a giant explosion, has resumed full production.

This is according to Mr Shane Moore, production manager of the National Explosives factory.

This factory was partially destroyed in an explosion on 24 November of last year.

The explosion took place during a violent thunderstorm, and its force was felt as far away as in Bronkhorstspruit, about 20 km away from the factory.

It was presumed at the time that a bolt of lightning caused the explosion.

The factory produces the explosive Tovex Explogel. This is a relatively "safe" explosive that can only be activated with an ignition charge.

Mr Moore said that the building that was destroyed in the explosion was not repaired. A new building was erected on the site of the old one for about one million rands.

He said that the chief inspector of explosives has already completed his investigation and that the findings may be released next month.

12271

## ECONOMIC

**IDC's Low Interest Plan To Boost Industrial Development**

34000422a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY in English*  
8 Feb 88 pp 1, 2

[Article by Mike Collins]

[Text] The Industrial Development Corporation's (IDC) weekend announcement of a new low (5 percent) interest scheme will mean a huge cash injection of about R1bn for industrial development over the next 10 months.

Timed to coincide with President P. W. Botha's economic policy announcement, the IDC move will also help create 25,000 new jobs and put R300m at the disposal of medium-sized independent industrialists immediately.

IDC Gm Carel van der Merwe says the scheme is aimed at promoting new investment directed at import replacement, exports and job creation.

"Investment of R1 by the IDC normally means R3 in total. For every R1 we spend, you can expect another R2 to come from the private sector—banks and institutions will supply services such as working capital. While we provide some of the fixed assets, the balance that we cannot finance will also come from outside."

"We view this as a major step, especially with rising interest rates. Quite a few big loans application people, who have been hedging their bets in the past few weeks, will now come into the picture."

The scheme will be made available to independent industrialists or groups with total assets (fixed assets plus current assets) of up to R50m at the time of application.

It is intended primarily for new manufacturing projects that will create new or additional jobs and projects that will create new or additional capacity to generate sales of which at least 30 percent is directed towards import replacement or exports.

The IDC also emphasises that loans will be granted on the proviso that the applicant's funding structure is not unreasonably strained—not less than 30 percent owner's funds to total assets after the expansion.

Interest at 5 percent a year will apply for the first three years, provided 60 percent or more of the expected sales from the project will be directed towards import replacement and/or exports.

After three years the borrower may choose between the IDC's then prevailing fixed or fluctuating interest rates, but at no time will the rate exceed 14 percent.

In cases where less than 60 percent but more than 30 percent of new sales will be directed at exports or import replacement, half of the loan will be made available at the 5 percent scheme and the balance at normal IDC rates for the full term of the loan.

The scheme is intended to support the independent medium-sized manufacturers, as they are not in the same position as large industries to negotiate more favourable interest rates.

"While there is a firm upswing in the economy, the IDC wants to do all it can to give further momentum to this trend," Van der Merwe says.

**New Lab for Fireproof Material Research Opened**  
34010019d Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
17 Dec 87 p 23

[Text] A research and testing laboratory with two million rands worth of specialized equipment is the latest addition to Cullinan Refractories, which produces a wide range of fireproof materials.

The new laboratory at the factory east of Pretoria was designed in conjunction with the Building Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).

The first of three phases of development at the factory has already been completed. Construction on phases two and three is due to be finished at the end of next year. After completion, the laboratory will be able to house a hundred technicians and researchers.

Mr Pierre Grobbelaar, the company's technical director, says that the new laboratory was built so that the South African fireproofing industry can keep pace with overseas technology.

"We are also working on negotiating with world leaders in this area in order to ensure that we may remain up-to-date with our own technical equipment and know-how," he said.

The laboratory is used for research on better practical applications of raw materials and products such as dolomite and chromium.

Provisions are also being made for chemically and physically testing fireproof materials.

A furnace chamber is used to determine the properties of the materials in the presence of high temperatures. This furnace chamber complies with national and international standards. One of the requirements with which this type of chamber must comply is the ability to control a rise in temperature within a certain period of time.

The company is the net exporter of fireproof materials in South Africa. Approximately one-tenth of all fireproof materials used locally are imported. Cullinan Refractories hopes to replace these imported materials with locally produced materials.

Dr Chris Garbers, president of CSIR, praised the company's import substitution program.

He says that South Africa has a production capability that is comparable to that of any other industrialized country. In this way, local industries can become world leaders in all areas of fireproof materials technology.

"Cullinan Refactories has been supplying South African companies that produce metal and ceramics with fire-proof materials for nearly an entire century. After 85 successful years, it is still developing ways in which to ensure its leading position as purveyor to domestic and foreign markets.

"Because of the size of the domestic market, it is necessary that export markets be cultivated in areas where South African raw materials show potential," Dr Garbers said.

12271

**Drought Destroys Most of Maize Crop**  
34000422d Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English  
10 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by David Braun and Paul Olivier]

[Text] Drought-stricken maize farmers are facing economic ruin because of the failure of 75 percent of the country's white maize crop.

The Minister of Agricultural Economics, Mr Greyling Wentzel, currently on a two-day helicopter tour of most of the Transvaal and the Free State, said yesterday that he was shocked at the extent of the damage.

Mr Wentzel will report to President Botha and the Cabinet when he has finished his tour today.

The new setback will require further Government assistance, putting pressure on the Government to increase its expenditure at a time when it is trying to reduce this as part of the programme to boost the economy.

It is already too late to save some areas scorched by the heatwave of the past few years and it is feared that the total harvest in the Western Transvaal could be lost if it does not rain very soon.

South Africa, normally a maize-exporting nation, may once again have to import this staple foodstuff.

Other crops at risk, it is feared, include sunflowers, dried beans and groundnuts.

Farmers in the summer rainfall areas will continue to receive indirect financial aid and assistance.

Mr Wentzel told more than 250 farmers near Ottsdal in the western Transvaal; yesterday that the Government could not allow the collapse of the infrastructure in the rural areas. He encouraged farmers to diversify their crops.

He said organised agriculture could not compensate maize farmers financially for the loss of their harvests or write off their debts but it would do everything in its power to help.

Many farmers, hit by the drought, are facing sequestration.

The yellow maize crop, used mainly as cattle feed, is not at much risk as this grows primarily in the Eastern Transvaal which has had good rains.

Mr Wentzel today ends his tour in Bothaville, heart of the maize belt, after holding discussions with representatives of the South African Agricultural Union, the Transvaal Agricultural Union, the Free State Agricultural Union, the Northern Cape Agricultural Union, the National Maize Producers' Organisation and representatives of other organisations.

The crop failure could have serious repercussions on the food industry. Last year food price rises were the major contributor to inflation, increasing by 26 percent against 13.7 percent for all prices.

19274

## SOCIAL

**Irish Terrorists Pledge Arms Support to ANC in Secret**  
34010026b Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
15 Jan 88 pp 1, 2

[Article by Tim Clarke: "Secret Leaks: IRA's Weapons to SA: Full Support for ANC"]

[Text] Durban—Provos, the military wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has promised its full support to the ANC and will help that terrorist organization with attacks against South Africa, according to a resolution at a secret meeting in Cork, in southern Ireland.

At the secret meeting on Tuesday evening, which was addressed by Denis MacFlerty, the vice chairman of the military wing, strong and bitter attacks were voiced against South Africa, State President P.W. Botha and British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

According to information obtained by BEELD about the meeting, MacFlerty said that the IRA will help the ANC this year in particular because it has received a shipload of arms with which the Republic can be attacked.

He disparaged President Botha as an "total dictator" and said that he is keeping Blacks in "servitude."

President Botha and Mrs Thatcher are hand in glove in oppressing people, "but things are going to change this year and there is a shock awaiting the British army in Ireland."

MacFlerty also said that there are a number of ways in which South Africa can be attacked and that there are numerous ways of infiltrating the country.

He promised that the IRA will support the ANC with heavy artillery and "small and large" weapons.

MacFlerty also inveighed against the South African Police and Defense Forces, promising, "With our new, refined weaponry, we will force them to their knees and liberate the Blacks that are so horribly oppressed. President Botha can then open his mouth and scream."

A number of ANC representatives, including Denis Kasrils, who is generally regarded as the second-most powerful man in the ANC, attended the secret meeting.

They were accompanied by an Indian from Natal known as Rashid, who for many months has been arranging attacks against South Africa from Botswana, among other things.

He has been very much involved in various attacks in South Africa, and is regarded as one of the masterminds behind the bomb attack at Magoo's Bar in Durban, in which three people were killed and at least 57 were injured.

MacFlerty promised the ANC representatives at the highly secret meeting that the "campaign will begin soon" and that the ANC will be fully supported by the IRA's military wing.

He said that more meetings will be held between the IRA and the ANC and that a strategy will be planned for attacking the South African defense forces from Swaziland, Mozambique and Botswana.

MacFlerty also promised that there will be "air support," although he did not elaborate on this.

He said that the military wing of the IRA decided as early as last December that it would carry out attacks on the "oppressive South African forces," in part "to force Mrs Thatcher to her knees."

12271

**Cuban Withdrawal Seen as USSR Ploy**  
34010020c Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
17 Dec 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Red Withdrawal?"]

[Text] The Russians in the process of pulling out of Angola? The immediate reaction will be one of applause. Because as a nation that sets "grass fires" worldwide (President Ronald Reagan's words), Russia's withdrawal will not only promote detente between the superpowers, but also be very significant for political solutions in southern Africa.

But with the USSR, one must always temper optimism with sound skepticism. It is well-known that Moscow—just like its apprentices, the SA Communist Party and the ANC—is prepared to make tactical adjustments. However, there is still no evidence that it is abandoning its long-term goals.

There must be an extremely compelling reason for Russia to get out of Angola. Can things really be so bad with its economy? Will it now, after years of investment, hand Angola over to probably the Western and perhaps the South African sphere of influence?

The fact that we should not be too naive in our assessment of Russian moves is evidenced in part by the fact that many Cuban mercenaries have acquired Angolan citizenship. Thus, Russia can appear to be getting out, but its agents will always be ready in the stomach of the Trojan horse.

Only after compliance with the provisions of the earlier Alvor agreement, with free designation of a government in Angola and the replacement of the current oppressive faction regime with long-term political rule, will we begin to believe that the Kremlin is sincere.

Until then, be vigilant and avoid hurrahs.

12271

**Japanese, Chinese Bidding on Historical Real Estate in Cape**  
34010022a Pretoria *DIE AFRIKANER* in Afrikaans  
17 Dec 87 p 1

[Article: "More Naboth's Vineyards Bartered Away"]

[Text] The selling of Cape hereditary farms and historical manors to foreigners is continuing. Earlier this year the Reserve Bank gave permission for foreigners to buy properties with financial rands, which enables them to bid twice as high as local buyers. The latest news is that Japanese and Chinese with money are also interested in settling among the whites on old Cape wine farms and other historical properties. The selling has in the meantime also spread to the Swartland, according to a financial journal. There are supposedly negotiations on 30 million rands of Swartland farm property. The initiative in the increasing Agab transactions is, according to the journal, emanating in particular from two real estate agents, Pam Golding Properties and the Johannesburg Seef [sic - v.i.] Group.

The sale of Kronendal, the old historic manor at Hout Bay which was built in 1800 by J.G. van Helsdingen, is being managed by Pam Golding Properties; as is also that of the old Noordhoek manor and the historic Stellenkloof farm, a horse stud farm of 29 hectares at the foot of Stellenberg. Mrs Carmelia Seef and Mr Rob McKee of the Seef Group are leaving soon on a visit to West Germany and the USA, where they intend to put

more than 20 Boland and Swartland farms on the market. It is apparently mainly people from Europe who are interested in the properties, especially British, West Germans and Swiss. America has also produced several big buyers. The Japanese and Taiwan Chinese interest was aroused only very recently. The Boland and Swartland farm communities are very concerned about the latest developments. They blame the attitude of the president of the Reserve Bank, Dr Gerhard de Kock, and the minister of finance, Mr Berend du Plessis.

13084

**AWB Rowdy Behavior Further Weakens CP Position**  
*34010026a Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans*  
*15 Jan 88 pp 1, 2*

[Text] The rowdy behavior exhibited by the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] at a National Party gathering in Standerton two evenings ago could cost the Conservative Party dearly.

Several people in that electoral district, where a by-election is to be held on 2 March, yesterday expressed their shock at the incident, as well as their doubt concerning whether they can continue to support the CP under these circumstances.

The misconduct could also be seen on television yesterday evening. This, plus words spoken by Minister F.W. de Klerk in the pitch dark hall, probably made an impression on voters all across the nation.

While on television only a couple of faint lights were visible in the hall, the voice of Minister De Klerk was clearly audible, especially when he said that he was ashamed of the way in which his fellow Afrikaners had behaved at that gathering.

It is a well-known fact that there is a close link between the CP and the AWB. Some of the CP's members of the House of Assembly are AWB members.

The AWB's behavior at Standerton is the latest in a number of attacks on NP gatherings in Transvaal that have not only been widely condemned, but have also put pressure on CP leader Dr A.P. Treurnicht to disassociate himself from the AWB.

Nationalists in Standerton also pointed out yesterday that the AWB's attack on Minister De Klerk's gathering ultimately failed and that the NP must make its case fearlessly in the by-election.

Mr Jan Pieterse, a farmer from Val in the electoral district, told BEELD yesterday, "Several CP people have told me that they are through with the CP now. The whole ruckus benefited the NP in the end."

Mr Hannes Swart, a farmer from Devon, said, "I think it was a victory for the NP. After the ruckus, many people came back into the hall. Friends told me about an elderly man who said afterwards that he is a CP man, but that if that is how those people are going to act, then he cannot go along with them."

After, among other things, fist fights broke out in the hall, the meeting was adjourned for half an hour. When it resumed—after lightning had cut off electric power in the town—Minister De Klerk finally addressed a full house of NP supporters without incident.

"I was very ashamed that my fellow Afrikaners could behave like that," Mrs Martie Browne of Evander said yesterday. "I know CP people who are saying now that they are ashamed of the AWB and that they will not vote for the CP again."

The NP's candidate in the by-election, Mr Hennie Erasmus, said yesterday, "It was disgraceful that whites could act that way towards whites. My feedback on it is that the AWB's behavior has caused many CP supporters to decide to vote for the NP."

A businessman from Evander who also attended the gathering but asked that his name not be given said that the AWB's behavior was shocking. "However, this could be a turning point. This could make people think about what they are doing. It wasn't tear gas that drove the trouble-makers out of the hall, it was the NP people. This type of gangsterism cannot be tolerated any longer."

Moreover, it appears that most of the agitators were not from the electoral district, but rather were "imported." Some of them apparently rode to the meeting in station wagons and later in the evening had their own small meeting in the town.

The AWB also reportedly distributed pamphlets at the meeting claiming that blacks have smaller brains than whites and that because of the allegedly smaller brain mass they do not have the same capability of self-control, judgement and reasoning.

An area resident characterized this as a very ironic commentary on the rowdiness at the gathering.

In the meantime, Dr Treurnicht said yesterday that he is in favor of a television debate, but Minister De Klerk "would see no chance" of a public debate.

"The CP has its own way of handling violence, and it is ironic that Mr De Klerk would call for my help in light of yesterday evening's debacle in Standerton," he added.

"The members of the AWB showed up yesterday evening at the gathering in reaction to Minister De Klerk's challenges," he said. "He himself must explain why his government let a communist and traitor go free."

Concerning the invitation to a debate, Dr Treurnicht said that he is not interested if Minister De Klerk is going to continue with the polemics engaged in last year in RAPPORT.

12271

**East Transvaal Civilian Commando Described**  
*34010024a Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans*  
*Jan 88 pp 18, 19*

[Unattributed article: "Every Citizen Can Help Protect the RSA"]

[Text] The defense and protection of South Africa cannot become the burden of the South African Defense Forces alone. Every citizen—regardless of race, age or sex—has a duty to perform without necessarily being a full-time SADF member.

The threat on land to the RSA can be divided into two main components, that is, a conventional threat from beyond our borders and an internal, revolutionary threat.

From this necessity was born the concept of "area defense" which can be defined broadly as the coordinated action of a community to increase its own preparedness to defend its own lives and property—with the commandos as the core element.

Area defense forces are local forces organized according to the 10 military districts and are composed primarily of the Commando Force. The local use of commando units provides military protection throughout the entire country which can ensure early recognition (intelligence) of subversive activities, pro-active operations and rapid military reaction.

The Commando Force's duties are diverse and include the following:

- Performing intelligence functions;
- Carrying out civic action (pro-active operations);
- Defense of home and hearth;
- Defense of National Strategic Points and other locations and areas;
- Support to the South African Police;
- Direct reaction to enemy operations.

Great emphasis is placed on the involvement of the community, whether in uniform or not. Every commando unit must be organized in such a way that it can accomplish its tasks in the most efficient manner.

The organization must be adapted to the circumstances and operational requirements of each commando unit while taking into account the locally available manpower. And this is precisely the beauty of area defense, particularly as it relates to the private sector of the community. The community is employed on a voluntary basis to look after its own home and hearth. Thus, people are trained to work together in the defense of their particular area without their being required to leave their work or homes for long periods of time to perform military service.

For that reason, then, the training methods also will differ from community to community. The week-long "buttermilk camps"—or "Dad's Army" as it is sometimes called—is not convenient for everyone, and in such cases training is done in the evening and on the weekends. On the other hand, Civil Defense is a more practical solution in urban areas.

Thus it happens that farmer A and store manager B from town X are trained in the use of communications systems and weapons. They continue to pursue their civilian occupations in an ordinary manner but are ready for action in case of emergency.

Area defense forces are constituted according to the building block system. This consists of grouping people together into functional platoons, squads and companies who, because of geographical, economic and cultural factors, logically belong together. Consequently, a commando unit organization is not constrained by the standard organization of an infantry battalion. Rather, it is cast along the lines of an aggregation of people in functional groups. Thus, a commando platoon can consist of any reasonable number of persons and the same applies to commando squads and companies.

Each commando unit has a reaction force at its disposal which must be capable, at short notice, of the following:

- Direct support of the South African Police in the conduct of COIN Ops (counterinsurgency operations);
- Pursuit of the enemy until other forces can take over;
- Patrolling of the commando unit's area;
- Reinforcement of area defense force elements if and when necessary.

The general community is not expected to run around in the field for days and nights on end—this is primarily left up to the reaction force. John Q. Public is trained as a home-and-hearth defender and is responsible for the following:

- Awareness of and involvement in intelligence matters;
- Use of the equipment required to carry out the assignment;

—Aiding his buddy;

—Practicing the basic battle drill in the functional role to which the member is assigned through informal in-service, on-the-spot training.

Various mechanisms are also available to support the community—namely, the police reservists, commando units, Civil Defense, the National Administration System and the South African Police.

At the invitation of Maj Gen J. J. Bischoff, commanding general of the East Transvaal Command, PARATUS went to investigate that concept. Three areas were visited, and although the final goal is the same, the circumstances, requirements and methods vary to a great extent. The emphasis is placed on the involvement and motivation of the community so that it can spot irregularities and subsequently provide the security forces with vital intelligence.

The first area to come under scrutiny is Group 28, which includes Middelburg, Groblersdal, Belfast, Witbank, Marble Hall and Lydenburg.

The greatest problems have occurred in Steenpoort Valley because of the neighboring state of Lebowa. Cattle theft on a large scale has occurred with attendant unrest and intimidation. In cooperation with local commando units, a "blanket security" plan was decided upon to provide mutual assistance during an emergency. Inhabitants are divided into platoons according to their geographical location and cohesion in order to provide mutual assistance. The size and composition of the various platoons was not taken into account. Where there were excess people, small reaction forces were created.

Subsequently, each platoon, with a commando unit member as leader, put its own problems and requirements down on paper and, accordingly, separate emergency plans were devised. In each of those plans potentially troublesome areas, dangers, solutions and actions are identified.

Joining the commandos is not a prerequisite but it entails definite advantages because members are entitled to a weapon. MARNET radios are also provided to selected individuals.

All irregularities and incidents are classified under one of three conditions, either requiring preventive measures (condition 1: Green), requiring intervention (2: Yellow), or requiring anti-crime measures, (3: Red). The Joint Operational Center (GOS) is approached if condition 3 is reached.

The greatest advantage of Group 28's security plan is that the community members are trained and are at the ready without having to leave their farms or work for long periods of time. The system also prevents people from having to drive many kilometers to do service.

The second area occupies the eastern-most portions of Transvaal. It borders on Mozambique, Swaziland and Kangwane and includes, among others, Nelspruit, where the headquarters of Group 33 is located. The principal problem area here is the infiltration of illegal immigrants from Mozambique, which has a complicating affect upon the SADF's job of rounding up ANC members.

For the most part, the area depends on agriculture and rivers, which requires that these be defended. Local commando units have therefore had little difficulty in obtaining the community's support and involvement. The area is divided into four companies with a fifth company as a reaction force. Eventually each company will get its own reaction force.

Three operations have been launched to coordinate and facilitate Group 33's diverse tasks. The first of these is aimed at border control and is taken care of primarily by the Lembombo Plain commando unit. The second consists of patrols in black residential areas and the third in white residential areas.

The Kaftan detector-fence between Mozambique and South Africa also contributes to the success of the operations. This 62-km electrified barrier detects illegal refugees and deliberations are under way concerning extending the fence into the Kruger National Game Park.

Firearms training for black farm workers will begin shortly so that they can do duty on their farms. This development points up the enthusiasm of the inhabitants.

Radios and alarm systems are to be found at practically every isolated house, and cooperation exists with the South African Police.

Secunda (Group 12) differs in many respects from the first two cases because it is primarily a densely populated industrial area.

Area defense is conducted here on two levels: The industrial wing concentrates on Sasol-2 and 3 as well as on the four mines which supply raw materials to those enterprises. The rural wing sees to the farms outside of the town.

The emphasis is upon area control, whence the full-time SADF element. Numerous intelligence zones exist in the urban area, each of which contains cells to gather intelligence. This system is also applied in black residential areas and mining towns.

Practically every cell leader occupies a managerial position in Civil Defense and has direct radio connections to the central operations room. Commando unit members in the industrial wing sleep in camp to form the full-time reaction force.

Similar cells are deployed in the rural area and here the commando unit members receive weapons to take to their homes. Three companies, which consist primarily of farmers, do service here. An additional two reaction force companies ensure the security of the surrounding small towns.

Good progress is being made now with the training of women and black workers. Large numbers of blacks have already been informed about the activities of the Secunda commando unit, and, according to estimates, already more than 200 women can handle radios and weapons.

Regardless of the perspective from which area defense is viewed, only advantages can be discerned. To defend your home and hearth by yourself is a hopeless task. On the other hand, the taxpayer cannot afford to assign full-time SADF personnel to perform that giant task.

And it all comes back to the beauty of area defense—the voluntary employment of the community to look after its own interests. With little trouble and sacrifice it is now possible to live and work in secure surroundings—without the citizenry's daily life being seriously disrupted.

13238/9604

**Chief of Security Police on Struggle Against ANC**  
34010025a Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
15 Jan 88 p 2

[Article by Jan Taljaard: "Will Attempt to Regain Lost Esteem—Chief of Security: ANC Forced Back in Its Struggle"]

[Text] The ANC has been forced back to the first phase of revolutionary warfare, after having decidedly moved towards the second phase of the classical revolutionary pattern prior to the announcement of the state of emergency in 1985, says Gen Maj Johan van der Merwe, chief of the Security Police.

In an exclusive interview with *BEELD*, he said yesterday that the expected attack by the ANC during the holidays was in part thwarted by the fact that the Security Police made several important breakthroughs in the months preceding December.

*BEELD* spoke with him after Mr Adriaan Vlok, the minister of law and order, announced the day before yesterday that a terrorist was shot dead Tuesday in Soweto, and that six collaborators were imprisoned over the last few days.

Gen Van der Merwe said that it must be assumed that the ANC will now attempt to regain lost esteem. The propaganda campaign in order to achieve that goal has already begun. The ANC will also probably try to reassert itself through acts of terrorism.

"But the intelligence community is thoroughly informed. We will take the steps necessary to prevent the plans from being put into effect," Gen Van der Merwe said.

In his opinion, two breakthroughs in particular were decisive to the calm Christmas season that South Africans were able to enjoy last month.

—The first breakthrough came when the terrorists who were allegedly responsible for the series of land mine explosions in the northern Transvaal in 1985 were apprehended.

Two families were nearly wiped out in one of those explosions. Moreover, two security policemen were presumably murdered at the end of 1986 by a member of the same gang of terrorists.

(A trial involving two of the alleged terrorists began last October in Messina. A verdict in that case is expected to be handed down at the end of next month.)

—The second breakthrough was when the Security Police exposed a large ANC network in the Western Cape in the middle of last year. Four district commanders were taken into custody, and the Police confiscated a large number of hidden weapons.

"The discovery of that weapon storage site as well as other smaller weapons storage sites throughout the country meant that the ANC terrorists were left, as it were, without weapons for the planned terrorism campaign in December," says Gen Van der Merwe.

In the month preceding Christmas, seven terrorists trained abroad and three who had been trained locally were taken into custody, he added.

At the same time, three terrorists who had been trained in the GDR and in special training camps in Angola were shot to death by security forces.

According to Gen Van der Merwe, those 13 terrorists do not constitute the largest number to be eliminated by security forces in one month. Last year alone, a total of 106 terrorists were eliminated.

Of that figure, 80 were taken into custody and 26 were shot dead. This represents 14 more terrorists than in the previous year and no less than 70 more than in 1985.

Gen Van der Merwe also referred to intensified steps taken by the Police: Precautionary measures were taken at border posts and along the national borders, while roadblocks were set up across the country during December.

This, plus the vigilance of the public, bore fruit: There was no serious incident of terrorism during the Christmas and New Year's season.

According to Gen Van der Merwe, the announcement of the state of emergency and actions by the security forces have forced the ANC to fall back to the first stage of revolutionary warfare.

—According to the classical theory by Mao Tse-Tung, the first phase consists of identifying the dissatisfied parts of the "masses" and forming cells and potential terrorist gangs.

Propaganda, the sowing of disorder and acts of terrorism constitute the foundation for the first phase. In the second phase, active military operations begin, and the terrorists attempt to "conquer" areas in which they can appear in broad daylight and can readily and freely move about.

This is followed by a third and final phase, in which the terrorists carry out large-scale military operations and attempt to overthrow the existing system.

According to Gen Van der Merwe, the ANC is currently in the process of starting over at square one, attempting to erect networks and cells. "However, they have not have much success in the past, and we will see to it that they will not be successful now," Gen Van der Merwe said.

#### ANC Increasingly Bent on Murder

Whereas railroad installations and attacks on government buildings were initially the most important ANC targets, the target over the years has shifted to one of murdering and attempting to murder civilians.

Figures handed over to BEELD yesterday afternoon by the Security Police in Pretoria indicate that attacks on the railroads during the 9 years from 1976 to the end of 1984 constitute no less than 20.75 percent of all terrorist acts during that period.

The 46 attacks and attempted attacks on government and public buildings during that period constitute the next-highest percentage, namely 17.36 percent. The murder and attempted murder of policemen represented a relatively small 15.85 percent of all terrorist acts.

During the following 2 years—from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1986—the picture changed drastically. During that period, a total of 153 attacks on civilians took place. This is 41.8 percent of all terrorist acts.

Attacks on policemen increased sharply during that period. There were 97 incidents of murder and attempted murder. This constitutes 26.5 percent of all terrorist acts during that period.

Attacks on policemen and members of the Defense Forces dropped last year to 82. But this was still 35.04 percent of all terrorist acts.

The percentage represented by attacks on civilians remained about the same last year, namely 41.88 percent.

In the 10 years beginning in 1976, murders and attempted murders of civilians were continually the largest single percentage of terrorist acts.

The total of 320 incidents of murder and attempted murder of civilians and government officials (excluding policemen and members of the Defence Forces) represents 37 percent of the total number of terrorist acts during those 10 years.

A total of 30.17 percent of the murders and attempted murders were of policemen. A total of 25 percent of the terrorist [text missing] property, government and public buildings and power installations.

12271

#### Hendrickse's Dias Celebration Boycott Viewed */34010023d Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 11 Jan 88 p 8*

[Text] It is to be regretted that politics is being dragged into the Dias festival because a colored member of the President's Council was asked to leave a beach reserved for whites only near Mosselbaai. The two are not connected, and the Rev Allan Hendrickse's appeal for a nationwide boycott of the celebration creates the impression of political opportunism, not of well-thought-out leadership. The Dias festival was organized to celebrate an important event in South Africa's history. It is not a political occasion. As a matter of fact, the festival committee went out of its way from the very beginning to get coloreds involved in the festival. Invitations were sent to colored schools to get them involved, while talks were also held with two assistant directors of colored education.

Unfortunately there are indications that certain individuals in the colored community are trying to misuse the festival for political purposes. It is also evident from the statement by Mr Gene Louw, administrator of the Cape, that deliberate attempts have been made to prevent colored participation in the festival. A golden opportunity to build up better attitudes through the festival celebrations is thus being rejected, obviously without the organizers having been offered any sound objections. The Rev Hendrickse is mistaken by his assertion that coloreds do not have anything to celebrate about the

arrival of Dias, "in view of the fact that he paved the way to the Orient and our oppression." Does that population group then have no interest in South Africa's earliest history? And it was certainly not Dias who determined the political course of events in the country.

Displeasure by Rev Hendrickse and other members of the colored community over the incident in which a colored member of the President's Council was asked to leave a white beach is understandable. But the way to remove problems of that nature is not by a boycott of the Dias festival. Inquiries are already being made at the highest level on methods for making more satisfactory arrangements after the President's Council recommended last year that the Law on Separate Facilities should be scrapped. The Rev Hendrickse must be aware of this. How does he hope that a boycott of the festival can make any contribution to bringing about another dispensation?

13084

**Carel Boshoff to Devote Life To Founding Afrikaner Homeland**  
34010027e Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*  
17 Jan 88 p 12

[Article by Koos Venter: "Beard Is Really for His Own Great Trek"]

[Text] Pretoria—Give him about a million Afrikaners, around 80,000 square kilometers of land and, of course, water. That will be Prof Carel Boshoff's Afrikaner homeland. Where, geographically? It looks like the Karoo or a piece of land along the Orange River.

This is what the "new" Prof Carel Boshoff, leader of the Afrikaner National Sentinel [AV] is saying about the homeland to which he is now going to devote all his time. Since he resigned at the beginning of this year as professor of missionary studies on the Dutch Reformed theology faculty at the University of Pretoria, Prof Boshoff and the AV are now getting to work on the homeland. But first he must arrange the AV's Great Trek.

Yes, practically his own Great Trek, for which the son-in-law of the late Dr Hendrik Verwoerd has begun to grow a beard. Still only grass roots, as he himself says, but it has to be a bushy beard by the time of the festivities that South Africa last saw in 1938 with the symbolic ox-wagon trek—100 years after the Great Trek!

No, Prof Boshoff assures RAPPORT, his head is not full of politics now that he has left Tukkies [the University of Pretoria]. The most important thing for him now is the creation of an Afrikaner homeland. The homeland idea also runs throughout the AV's whole Great Trek 150 plans. The theme of the AV trek is "Trekking to Our Own." "Own" here means, among other things, our own language, freedom, education and, last but not least, land.

In Prof Boshoff's house on a hill in the Brummeria section of Pretoria, where the headquarters of the AV is also located, this is now the only activity for the AV's Great Trek. The AV set out on its own course last year, away from the FAK's [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies] "official" program to commemorate the Great Trek 150 years later.

In his latest newsletter, Prof Boshoff says that compromise with the FAK, for whom the AV is unacceptable for affiliation, is no longer possible. "We are moving in two directions."

The AV has a nationwide program for its own trek. Every town in the country will be involved along the 13 trek routes, including Windhoek, Namibia. There is even a special celebration emblem. All the treks arrive in Pretoria on 9 December, where a day of activities is offered at the Voortrekker Monument. The AV's major festivities will take place in Donkerhoek, between Pretoria and Bronkhorstspruit.

Prof Boshoff also encourages men to grow beards for the trek. He himself has already begun. Babies born this year can also receive special Great Trek certificates. Furthermore, the AV has thousands of souvenirs of the trek. A special novel about the Great Trek is being written, for which a prize of 15,000 rands is being offered. Several manuscripts have already been entered.

Besides the special trek novel, the AV is also publishing several other books, including a historical trilogy on the Great Trek. These are three works by Prof G.D.J. Duvenhage, formerly of the University of the Western Cape. The first of them is called "Vegkop" [Fighter], the second "Die Manifes" [The Manifest] and the third "Die Geloofte" [The Covenant]. The first two are already available.

12271

**Natal Police Praised for Role in Black-on-Black Violence**  
34010023e Cape Town *DIE BURGER in Afrikaans*  
7 Jan 88 p 14

[Editorial: "Natal Power Struggle"]

[Text] It is to be welcomed that the police are going to make an intensified effort to end the violence among blacks in the Pietermaritzburg area. The Natal area is an unfortunate exception at a time when incidents of unrest are occurring only sporadically in the rest of the country. Besides the tragic loss of hundreds of human lives and damage to property in black areas there, the lingering unrest also has a detrimental effect at other levels. Those inside and outside the Republic who wish ill of South Africa superficially present the murder and slaughter in Natal as part of the "struggle" against the South African Government. It is convenient for such people to blame "apartheid" for what is happening there. The unrest and

ever rising number of deaths can keep alive overseas the image of a country in revolt, with negative consequences for confidence in the Republic in foreign government and business circles.

The fighting in Natal has little to do with "apartheid." A black power struggle is going on there, to be clearly distinguished from unrest based on imagined or rightful grievances at other places in South Africa. There is no doubt that Inkatha and its leader, Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, are being challenged in KwaZulu and Natal. The United Democratic Front has already on occasion given to understand that KwaZulu/Natal is a target area where it wants to strengthen its influence. It is necessary that attempts be made to normalize the situation in Natal. Hopefully, the police get the cooperation of the law-abiding blacks there in order to bring the violence, from whatever side it comes, under control.

13084

#### Historian Sees New Future for Africa Through Capitalism

34010021a Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans  
9 Dec 87 p 11

[Article by Freek Swart: "Black Sheep Must Now Become Leader"; first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] One of the most important points made by historian Paul Johnson is that South Africa is now at the end of a quarter century of what he calls an "intellectual revolution." Since the wild experiments in Africa—of which apartheid was only one—have failed, South Africa is forced to again think about its future.

The system of the past must be replaced with something that has always been going on under the surface: the germination and rise of capitalism.

In this third article dealing with Johnson's ideas about South Africa, Freek Swart writes that Johnson sees for South Africa an extremely important leadership role in Africa. "The young people of all races in South Africa must reverse the spirit of failure in Africa," he writes.

Paul Johnson repeatedly emphasizes his view that events in South Africa cannot be isolated from the rest of the African continent: "All of Africa is a former colonial territory that is wrestling with the question of how it should express itself politically and how it should find its path to economic prosperity.

"Although South African independence began prior to the First World War, meaning that it was a generation or so ahead of the other African states, it basically had the same problems to solve as the other countries: how to replace political and economic rule exercised from Europe."

Every country made mistakes in the process of gaining independence. "In some cases, such as Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana, the mistakes were very serious, almost fatal," Johnson writes.

Although the mistakes vary in magnitude, they followed a common pattern, namely the politically erroneous idea that all economic and social issues have a political solution—provided that you are willing to implement your policy relentlessly enough, he adds.

According to Johnson, Kwame Nkrumah was the man who spelled out this view most clearly by contending that the local and economic development of Africa can only be achieved within the "political realm," and not vice versa.

"He was wrong!" Johnson says. "Others—Nyerere, Toure, Mengistu, three rather typical leaders—made the same type of mistake, and their countries paid a price for it."

He feels that just like them, South Africa made an erroneous judgement, which here assumed the form of apartheid. And all of these mistakes were different forms of state socialism, emphasizing the supreme power and invincibility of the political, ideological solution, resulting in the displacement of normal people in a grand process of social engineering.

According to Johnson, all these African plans failed economically, and all of them led in various ways to internal violence, although it is true that South Africa escaped the coups, rebellions and civil war that resulted from political errors of judgement in other African states.

But South Africa as well has paid a price for apartheid: through internal tension, an enormous state security apparatus and sporadic political violence.

"After Africa has placed its trust in the political realm for a quarter of a century, it seems to me that the continent is beginning to think better of it," Johnson says.

Johnson contends that African leaders are "gradually, painfully and almost reluctantly" beginning to realize that the state cannot do everything, that the state "can scarcely do anything good, aside from perhaps kill people, and that social and economic arrangements are best left to the judgement and wisdom of ordinary men and women in the private sector."

In his opinion, capitalism is "joyfully" stepping in where the state has thrown in the towel and withdrawn. "This process has gotten under way in many places in Africa, but because incalculable damage has already been done

to economic infrastructures that were inadequate and fragile to start with, it will be some time before this bears fruit. Still, I think that Africa is now setting out on the right path."

South Africa now has a golden opportunity to take the lead as the economically strongest country in Africa.

The young people of all races in South Africa must reverse the spirit of failure in Africa. Only people can provide the moral dimension to help round out the impersonal market system. They must provide the moral leadership that recognizes that economic success is the precondition for achieving anything else.

Johnson believes that South Africa will do this, in part because too many people of all races have much too much to lose if the alternatives should prove victorious.

12271

### Promise To Fight for Fatherland, Religion Reiterated

340100221 Pretoria *DIE AFRIKANER* in Afrikaans  
17 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Professor A.D. Pont: "Day of the Covenant: Reality of 'New' South Africa Contradicts Centuries-Old Afrikaner Ideal." First paragraph is *DIE AFRIKANER* introduction.]

[Text] The Day of the Covenant is the preserver of the flame of the Afrikaner's belief in God and his devotion to his people's ideal of freedom. That is why liberalists are always striving to make this holiday a controversial question, for they know that it is the symbol of the Afrikaner's unity and power. This article compares the Voortrekkers' struggle with our struggle today and explains why the true Afrikaner must preserve that very Day of the Covenant.

The Day of the Covenant is gradually becoming a day which is getting ever more difficult to celebrate. On the one hand there is a continual series of attacks being made against the day. There are objections that it is on our calendar as a religious day, like a Sunday. The demand is made that it should be proclaimed an ordinary holiday. It is then said, with the arguments in addition, that the Covenant is actually only valid for the descendants of the Voortrekker commando and that all the other Afrikaners and all who those who are today considered citizens of the country cannot be bound by the Covenant. With that it is actually argued that the "majority" of the country's citizens should not be pestered by a holiday which has to be observed like a Sunday. It sometimes appears that anything which is Christian in our country has become an irritation to the majority.

The integration talkers of course also have serious objections to the Day of the Covenant. For them the Day of the Covenant is an evil because it spoils good human relations. In addition, it is indeed such a "sectional" day, for it is valid only for the Afrikaner. They state that it would be much better just to abandon the Day of the Covenant and make something else of it, such as a "good will day across color boundaries" or a "fraternization day across religious boundaries." So the left is ever more creating a certain climate around the Day of the Covenant in order in this way to make the day controversial in the hope of thus making it unacceptable. But the Day of the Covenant is a problem even for the Afrikaner, who in fact wants to celebrate the Day of the Covenant, who in fact recognizes and wants to observe the bond of the Covenant.

If we note the historical framework of the Day of the Covenant and the fact that the Covenant was made on the eve of a crucial battle, then it becomes clear that the Covenant lay within the broader aim of the Voortrekkers to get their own fatherland in the interior of southern Africa. Indeed, [the Battle of] Blood River was fought to enforce the provisions of the Retief-Dingaan treaty and not to subjugate the Zulus to one or the other colonial power. The Day of the Covenant thus lies embedded in Voortrekker history when a hard and all-sacrificing battle was fought for the Afrikaner to find his own fatherland. The Day of the Covenant itself is central in that history, for it makes it clear that in all their activities the Voortrekkers put themselves under the authority of the Triune God and His Word and also gladly professed their dependence on God. That very Covenant makes it clear that the fatherland and national community which the Voortrekkers wanted to establish had to be subservient to the authority of the Triune God.

That Voortrekker ideal of freedom and independence, coupled with a complete subservience to God, reflects the faith, the spirit and the persuasion which made the Covenant possible. For the Afrikaner who still accepts it this way today, the commemoration of the Day of the Covenant and everything that it implies is problematic precisely because the reality of the "new" South Africa on the road to black majority rule contradicts everything for which the Voortrekkers lived, worked, fought and died.

### Retief and the Causes of the Great Trek

To make this matter clearer to some extent, it is perhaps necessary to again take note of Piet Retief's famous manifesto which appeared in the GRAHAM'S TOWN JOURNAL on 2 February 1837. In it he gives the reasons for his leaving the Colony and then says, among other things: "We despair of saving the Colony from the evils which threaten it because of the alarming and rash behavior of vagrants who are allowed to disturb the country in all its parts; and we also do not see that there is any prospect of happiness or peace for our children in a country which is being disturbed in this manner by

internal agitations." If, in addition, we note the reasons which Uys, Maritz and Potgieter indicated, then Duvenhage's conclusion is correct when he states (G.D.J. Duvenhage, 1987. "The Great Trek." Part II: 1837 - The Manifesto, Pretoria: Die Afrikanervolkswag): "They all broke away from the devastated country so that the great emigration was finally borne by a craving for liberation from the material, social and spiritual threats under the foreign, pragmatic, ineffective and philanthropically inspired British regime."

Seen thus, the Great Trek was a freedom movement; it was a powerful popular movement to seek their own fatherland and to find where the Voortrekkers could be themselves and could rule themselves according to their own laws and customs. The Day of the Covenant and Blood River stand in that atmosphere and neither the Covenant nor the Battle of Blood River can really be understood, be commemorated, be celebrated if that is not accepted.

#### Today

And where do we stand today? The two Boer republics which arose in 1852 north of the Vaal River and in 1854 north of the Orange River, and which were the logical conclusion of the Great Trek, perished in the devastating war for the Transvaal's gold in 1899-1902. However, the grand ideal of Afrikaner freedom in an Afrikaner fatherland did not perish, and the struggle for this was continued until the Republic of South Africa emerged in 1961. But that republic, which in 1961 was a home for the Afrikaner, actually began to perish with the murder of Dr H.F. Verwoerd in 1966. From then on plans have been systematically made and carried out to take away the Afrikaner's republic, fatherland and home. It was Schalk Pienaar who wrote in DIE BURGER that the HNP was driven out of the "National" Party in 1969 because those people wanted to make an Afrikaner republic out of the RSA.

The 1983 Republic then finally took the country away from the Afrikaner. Suddenly the Indians and Coloreds were ruling partners with more public say in the country than the Afrikaner. The blacks then simply got double citizenship; viz. in their own homelands and in the rest of South Africa. Nothing remained of an Afrikaner fatherland. Thus the Cape Liberal Nats, once they were in power, crossed out the Afrikaner's history from 1835 to 1966. And progressively no stone is being left unturned to create throughout the RSA a situation like that which was formerly in effect in the Cape Colony and which at that time was unacceptable to the Voortrekkers.

#### How Do We Observe the Day of the Covenant Now?

The Day of the Covenant, embedded in the Afrikaner's struggle for freedom, must be observed in our days precisely so that it can be made clear: the Afrikaner's struggle for freedom is still far from over! The political, cultural and ecclesiastical struggle of today is not only a

struggle for regaining political authority, but it is above all a struggle for freedom, a struggle to again give the Afrikaner a rightful place in his own fatherland, to prevent the Afrikaners as a people from being inundated by the numerical preponderance of the aliens and fortune hunters in the Afrikaner's fatherland. With a prophetic view, Dr H.F. Verwoerd said at a Day of the Covenant celebration at Blood River in 1958:

"Therefore, even if we cannot trek any more, we say just like the Voortrekkers of old: we can still struggle. And we will fight, even if we have to perish, but we will remain fighting for the survival of the white man at the southern tip of Africa and the religion which has been given him to spread here. And we will do it just like they did: man, woman and child. We will fight for our existence, and the world must know it. We cannot do otherwise."

The example of the all-sacrificing struggle which the Voortrekkers carried on is a source of inspiration to us in this very struggle. Just by looking back at the founders of the Afrikaner ideal on the Day of the Covenant, we can again clearly see the bright thread of our people's past and realize: it involves freedom, survival as the Afrikaner people, the right to be our own people in our own fatherland. We have to observe the Day of the Covenant precisely because the Day of the Covenant again reminds us that in our struggle we may never neglect the vertical bond with the Almighty and Triune God.

Finally, it is clear why the Day of the Covenant has to be made controversial by the liberalists nowadays: because the enemies of the Afrikaner people, who also know history and what consequences there were after the Covenant of 1838, after the reaffirmation of the Covenant in 1880 and after the Afrikaner people's dedication to the Covenant in 1938, must try to nip in the bud the Afrikaner people's faith in God and aspiration for freedom. We must understand that well. But, more than ever before, that places on us the bounden duty in these dark days to again light up the inextinguishable flame of our unshakable faith in God and our devotion and subservience to the Afrikaner's ideal of freedom. Our period demands dedicated, faithful Afrikanerdom so that out of a deep-rooted conviction we shall devote ourselves to the struggle in a way that we will not stop before victory is gained. Let the 1987 Day of the Covenant again become the day when we dedicate ourselves anew to God the Almighty and the Afrikaner's ideals of freedom.

13084

**Country's Orientation Towards Africa Discussed**  
34010020a Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans  
9 Dec 87 p 14

[Editorial: "South Africa and Africa"]

[Text] Despite the hostile rhetoric against South Africa that so frequently resounds from the rest of Africa, there is an inevitable bond of destiny between South Africa and the other countries of Africa that the latter cannot deny behind closed doors.

This bond of destiny should not be regarded by South Africans as a burden, but rather as an opportunity that must be seized. Coincidentally, two prominent South Africans this week who were separated by thousands of kilometers both touched on this subject.

In Zurich, Minister of Defense Gen Magnus Malan said the following before the Swiss-South African Association: "Our fates are bound to one another. And it is this knowledge that gives me confidence for a long-term future. Together we can achieve a great deal; together we can build a new Africa."

And Prof Christo Viljoen, dean of the Engineering Department at the University of Stellenbosch and one of the main speakers at a conference on technological development in Africa last week in the Ivory Coast, emphasized this week in an interview with DIE BURGER and in a speech at DIE BURGER's Youth Leadership Conference that South Africa has the opportunity to open doors in Africa in the area of technology. This opportunity must be seized with both hands in order to once again make South Africa the "Port to Africa." In the process, an enormous amount of sympathy and good will can be won in Africa.

Many South African leaders have long regretted the fact that South Africa has for too long regarded itself as an extension of Europe and not fundamentally as a part of Africa. Fortunately, the latter realization has in recent years begun to make inroads among growing numbers of South Africans.

The fact that there is in the meantime a great deal of silent potential for doing something about this situation is demonstrated by noting that more than 90 percent of the countries in Africa currently trade with South Africa.

Through trade and the extension of technological assistance, much can be accomplished towards improving South Africa's relations with the rest of the continent, and at the same time helping to uplift Africa. However, greater effort is required in a number of other areas. Every South African who is able to can play a role in this, so that there can be no losers, only winners.

12271

#### Youth Leaders Favor School Integration Without Lowering Standards

34010020b Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans  
9 Dec 87 p 5

[Text] South Africa can become a winning country, but in order for that to happen reform must take place at a faster and more readily perceivable pace, according to most of the young leaders at the Youth Leadership Conference held at Die Burger-Strandhuis in Muizenberg.

During the discussion at the last subsection, "A Country Seeking a Vision," of the main topic "South Africa—A Winning Country," most of the delegates said that the government should continue its reforms without fear of losing votes to the Right. At the same time, Blacks must be given freer access to the capitalist system.

Although several youth leaders were in favor of opening up schools, there was a difference of opinion on how this should be done. There was unanimity that educational standards cannot be allowed to fall.

Desiree Otto (Framesby High School) said that a person is a leader to the extent that he has a vision and maintains his individuality. A vision is only possible if you have understanding. Understanding emerges from the insight that people have in the present, past and future of this country.

It is thus necessary to learn from the past and rectify your mistakes. This is how the future can be built. In the future, anything is possible, and it is precisely this promise that enables people to have expectations for the future.

Grant Press (Bosmansdam High School) said that change is the only solution to the country's problems and that the young people of South Africa can play a major role in view of the fact that they are full of life and eager to learn.

It is precisely for this reason that the young people of the various population groups must come together and cooperate in solving the country's problems. "The future is in the hands of the young people, and if the various groups cooperate, South Africa will emerge from the fray as a winning country."

Penny Brislin (Renish Girls' High School) said that South Africa must move in the direction of a united country. The country needs leaders and entrepreneurs to lead and develop the country on the road ahead. A high educational standard is necessary for this.

If the country wants to solve its problems, there must be communication—something that is still very much lacking today. Perhaps whites still think too often that they have the answers for non-whites.

Marietjie Strauss (Vredendal High School) said that in education there should be less one-way communication between the teachers and students. Instead, young people must gain the opportunity to stimulate their own thinking.

After all, the young people are the ones who will have to make decisions about the country in the future. Thus, they will largely determine whether South Africa is to become a winning country. The capabilities of this country are wrapped up in its ability to think big and act big. The youth has the potential to do this.

Faffa Coetzee (Martin Oosthuizen High School) said that without a sound economy, the country will not be able to achieve a great deal. South Africa must set an economic goal for itself and do everything possible to achieve it. One major challenge is to increase productivity, and the creation of jobs that are labor-intensive must be a high priority.

A political arrangement can succeed only if it is preceded by economic development. Politicians must stop making promises about reform if they cannot implement this reform due to a lack of money.

Gladys Crampton (Kimberley Girls' High School) said that the diversity of nations must be a challenge for the country and not a stumbling block. It can in fact be used to make South Africa a strong country. This requires that each group's contribution, no matter how small, be acknowledged.

Acknowledgement must also be given to the fact that historical events such as the Great Trek and the Battle of Blood River are important to different population groups for different reasons. This requires that groups be sympathetic to one another and understand one another's aspirations.

Jano Jonker (Despatch High School) said that educating young people is an indispensable condition for South Africa to become a winning country. Although our educational system is a relatively good one, it is lacking in that not enough recognition is given to individuality, and too much emphasis is put on instruction and too little on education.

Students must be more involved in lessons using group discussions, and their creativity must be encouraged. Because uniformity is forced on students, they merely learn to go with the flow and not to think for themselves.

Karen Ordemann (J.G. Meiring High School) said that every South African has the obligation to develop such that he achieves full growth. "We must discover our own potential," she said, adding that South Africans do not have enough confidence in their own abilities.

The enormous power of the individual and the preservation of identity is a combination that will make South Africa into a winning country.

Caro Kriel (Tygerberg High School) said that unity is mightier than diversity. For this reason, the various population groups must strive for unity without sacrificing their own identity and culture. This is the foundation upon which a new South Africa can be built.

The existence of a group that has lost its identity becomes purposeless. In the process, however, a group cannot live alone on an island; rather, it must move out and strive for unity with others.

Callie du Preez (Diamantveld High School) said that there is a problem in South Africa in the area of religion in that people are turning God with a capital letter into god with a small letter. People must adapt to God, and not the other way around.

People should not link the Bible to politics, but rather conduct politics according to the Bible and God's will. Without this, there is no cornerstone on which to build.

Rowena van der Merwe (Groote Schuur High School) said that South Africa should not copy the American educational model, but rather draw up its own system adapted to the country's unique circumstances. South Africa requires greater decentralization in the area of education so that, for example, the curriculum of rural children is adapted to their specific needs.

Everyone should have equal opportunities, but should be permitted to learn what they want to learn.

Jacques van Wyk (Eben Dinges High School) said that South Africa can only be a winning country if every inhabitant of this country makes himself into a winner. This requires that each person have a vision for himself. How can someone have a vision for a country if he does not even have a vision for himself?

Everyone must think positively in view of the fact that this is the best way to create a meaningful atmosphere for living and to take another look around oneself at people and nature.

Anelda Mohr (La Rochelle Girls' High School) said that communication is a prerequisite for solving problems between groups. However, we must first correct our own mistakes before we can successfully communicate with other groups.

South Africans must seize every opportunity to communicate, since you can never lose with communication, but can only emerge from it stronger.

David Gibbon (Rondebosch Boys' High School) said that art, be it music visual art or drama, can play a major role in bridging the distance between the different groups in this country. It can help to create a unified South African culture while each group continues to keep what is important to it.

Everything that is worth the effort has the internal power to survive. South Africans should consider adopting Nkosi Sikilel's Afrika as the national anthem.

Frederich Neethling (Bredasdorp High School) said that the country's political problems will not be solved by simply forcing the whites to their knees. People must together seek harmony between the groups. Sports can play a major role in this respect.

The current approach within South African sports should perhaps be reconsidered.

Anmar von Molendorff (Langenhoven High School) said that it is important to distinguish between differences and divisiveness. Divisiveness is a skyscraper build on misunderstanding that can easily topple.

This skyscraper must be demolished, and a new building must be erected on the foundation that everyone is equal in God's eyes, that everyone should have equal opportunities and that people should comply with the commandment about love.

Dennis Ras (Vaalharts High School) said that South Africa has been driven into a corner and that all of its inhabitants must work together to get it out again. "We must wake up out of our dreams." Dreams can be dangerous if the dreaming is isolated and separate.

Young people must begin to speak their minds. "If we do not start now, we will not have the time later on. Speak out now, because you are the ones who must live here," he said.

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